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Disclaimer
The findings, opinions, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this guidebook are entirely those 
of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), UNEP Risoe Center, Technical University of Denmark, or Baker & McKenzie. This report is 
intended as a public resource for stakeholders undertaking activities that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, whether under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism or other market-based 
instruments for carbon trading. While this guidebook provides independent analysis of legal issues 
material to such activities, and has been prepared for informational purposes, it should in no way be 
relied upon or construed by the reader as legal advice. Independent legal or commercial advice should 
always be sought when undertaking a CDM Project or entering into the types of contracts described 
herein. Contractual provisions provided are examples only and should be carefully considered and 
modified to suit the particular circumstances of an individual project.
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71 Introduction
Participants in CDM projects face many risks. 
In addition to political and economic risks 
associated with investments in emerging 
markets, participants face new and unfamiliar 
risks linked to the Kyoto Protocol and its 
implementation, such as carbon price volatility, 
the risk that CERs will lose their value after the 
first Kyoto commitment period, and the need 
to obtain all necessary CDM project approvals. 
Likewise, the CDM Executive Board has 
identified weak domestic legal regimes as both 
a key barrier to CDM investment, in general, 
and as a contributing factor to the unequal 
regional distribution of CDM project activities. 
This underscores the need to strengthen 
domestic CDM regulatory structures in order to 
facilitate delivery and scale-up of the CDM, as 
well as the need for related capacity building, 
“in order to make the CDM function…”  
This Guidebook addresses a wide range of 
legal and regulatory issues arising from the 
domestic laws, regulations and policies of 
CDM Host Countries that can affect the 
development and implementation of CDM 
projects.  Host Country domestic laws interact 
– both negatively and positively – with the 
international rules that underpin the CDM. At 
this critical juncture of change and uncertainty 
surrounding the evolution of the carbon 
markets and the flexible mechanisms under 
the Kyoto Protocol, it is more important than 
ever that CDM stakeholders understand how 
such domestic legal and regulatory frameworks 
can be enhanced and harnessed to facilitate 
the development of a greater number of 
CDM projects that have clear sustainable 
development benefits.
Policymakers in CDM Host Countries have a 
key role to play in establishing more stable 
and functional domestic legal regimes that 
can increase the effectiveness of the CDM and 
mitigate risks faced by project participants. As 
a capacity building tool, the primary audience 
of this Guidebook is therefore climate change 
policymakers and CDM project developers in 
developing countries; however, carbon investors 
will find it of equal interest. The Guidebook 
illustrates some Host Country laws that 
specifically address the CDM, as well as how 
general domestic legal regimes may impact or 
inhibit CDM project implementation, such as:
property rights; •	
environmental and planning laws; •	
investment and taxation laws; and •	
financial services regulations.•	
 
The Guidebook further seeks to demystify the 
myriad, complex issues surrounding the domestic 
implementation of CDM, such as:
project approval processes;•	
CER ownership; and •	
taxation.•	
 
Development economists and policymakers have 
long recognized that predictable legal regimes 
are a foundation for economic growth and 
investment, a supposition demonstrated through 
numerous empirical country studies.  As the 
World Bank notes, “no matter what factors are 
included in the analyses and what measures of 
property rights security are used, all report a close 
connection between growth and property rights 
security.”  Secure legal rights afford entrepreneurs 
and investors enhanced prospects of reward, and 
greater incentive to devote time and resources to 
new ventures.  Without secure title to land and 
assets, predictability of treatment under financial 
services and taxation law, and clearly identifiable 
costs in complying with environmental and 
other regulations, even those who are willing to 
enter the market have difficulty procuring credit, 
accessing public infrastructure, and fending off 
rival claims to property.  The investment that 
does take place is often skewed either towards 
8activities that earn a short-term return or that 
enjoy special political favor.   
Weak domestic legal regimes can have a 
particularly negative effect on CDM projects 
– not just because carbon credit investments 
require secure rights to the underlying project, 
but also because they often entail long-term 
return periods and commitments that hinge 
upon the viability of an intangible asset.  
Viability will depend primarily on the security 
of the property rights surrounding the assets, 
the taxation and financial services treatment 
of the transactions, and the costs involved in 
complying with additional regulation, such as 
environmental approvals.  Therefore, where 
legal regimes are weak, it is precisely these 
forms of investment that suffer most.  
The International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA) hinted at this problem in a 2002 
guidance document on carbon contracts.  
Focusing on the security of property vis-à-vis 
the Host Government, it concluded: “there is a 
real sovereign risk issue because of the need to 
obtain Host Country approval,” and that “there 
needs to be a statement by the [Host Country] 
government that the financial participant holds 
clear title to the rights to the ERs and CERs or 
comparable benefits resulting from the project.” 
In addition to sovereign risk, ownership of, 
and title to, project assets and CERs has been 
identified by counsel to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration as a major source of potential 
disputes in carbon contracts.  Problems have 
also been noted even where legal rights are 
clear, if those rights lack legitimacy or are 
inconsistently implemented by local and 
regional authorities.  If the risk profile can be 
improved by clarifying the domestic legal and 
regulatory structures that affect CDM, this will 
be beneficial for the process as a whole.
For some of these issues, a limited amount 
of guidance is provided in the international 
rules governing the CDM (including the Kyoto 
Protocol, the decisions of the Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP) 
and the decisions of the CDM Executive Board 
– collectively the CDM Rules).  
Thus, this Guidebook is most usefully read in 
conjunction with companion analyses (also 
developed by Baker & McKenzie with the 
assistance of the UNEP Risoe Center and other 
donors) that provide detailed information on 
the international rules governing the CDM: 
Legal Issues Guidebook to the Clean •	
Development Mechanism, (http://cd4cdm.
org/Guidebooks.htm) which explains the 
legal and contractual issues at the various 
stages of the CDM process, focussing 
primarily on the international legal system; 
and
The CDM Rulebook•	 , which is a 
comprehensive online user-friendly 
database of all the international CDM 
Rules, practices and procedures, including 
decisions of the CDM Executive Board.  
(cdmrulebook.org).
The Guidebook is structured as follows:
Chapter 3•	  provides an introductory 
overview to the international rules of the 
CDM and the Kyoto Protocol; 
Chapters 4•	  and 5 set out Host Country 
laws which specifically address the 
implementation CDM, as well as Host 
Country laws generally that may impact 
upon or hinder the development of CDM 
projects;   
Chapter 6•	  addresses the range of domestic 
property-related laws relevant to CDM 
Projects;
9Chapter 7•	  examines the various domestic 
laws relating to taxation and financial 
services and their impact on CDM projects; 
Chapter 8•	  discusses the impact of 
domestic environmental laws on CDM 
projects; 
Chapter 9•	  provides a brief overview of 
the key contracting structures for CERs 
and explains how domestic law issues and 
risks are mitigated under such contractual 
arrangements.
10
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2 Executive Summary
Since its establishment in 1998 under Article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC ), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) has become firmly established. (The 
CDM is introduced in detail in chapter 3 of 
the Guidebook.) The success of the CDM 
is evidenced by the fact that, at the time of 
publication, more than 1,650 CDM projects 
had been approved by the CDM Executive 
Board, expected to generate a combined total 
of more than 1.3 billion Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs).  Hundreds more prospective 
CDM projects move closer to registration 
every day, as countries and companies around 
the world work together to use the CDM as a 
means of achieving their environmental and 
economic goals
While firmly established, the CDM also 
continues to evolve under an organic legal 
mechanism. Given that fact, and the relative 
immaturity of the international carbon markets, 
many legal issues remain to be addressed in 
order to ensure an effective functioning of the 
CDM. These include questions such as how 
Host Country domestic law interacts with the 
international CDM Rules, and how, in turn, a 
CDM Host Country can better utilise domestic 
legal structures to facilitate carbon investment 
within their jurisdictions. In all cases, however, 
the international CDM Rules stop short of 
providing definitive rules that govern the 
relationship of CDM participants with each 
other, with Host Country governments, and 
with the community at large.  Thus, these 
issues are governed to a greater or lesser extent 
by the rules that exist (and in many cases, do 
not exist) within Host Countries themselves 
and as defined in commercial contracts 
and arrangements between CDM project 
participants.  
This Guidebook thus focuses in particular 
on questions arising from the interaction of 
Host Country domestic laws with the CDM 
Rules that have evolved internationally.  It 
identifies key areas that should be considered 
by firms and individuals before entering into 
CDM projects in any Host Country, and aims 
to enhance an understanding among Host 
Country stakeholders and policymakers of the 
ways in which domestic legal structures can 
be harnessed and enhanced to facilitate CDM 
activities within their jurisdictions.
Non-Annex I Parties wishing to host CDM 
projects, and Annex I Parties seeking to 
authorize participation in CDM projects must 
ensure that their domestic laws:
comply with domestic legal requirements •	
imposed by the CDM; and
do not impede or preclude the •	
participation of those Parties in the CDM.
 
In order to host CDM projects, potential Host 
Countries must comply with a number of 
basic participation requirements which govern 
involvement in the CDM (the CDM Modalities 
and the CDM Rules).  These are outlined in 
chapter 3.  In brief, they include:
being a Party to the UNFCCC and the •	
Kyoto Protocol;
establishing a national authority •	
(Designated National Authority or DNA) 
capable of approving proposed CDM 
projects;
developing CDM project approval criteria; •	
and
issuing written approvals (•	 Letters of 
Approval or LoAs) for projects which have 
been approved as CDM projects by the 
DNA.
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DNAs have been structured by Parties in a 
number of ways, including as: units within 
existing government departments or ministries; 
inter-ministerial committees or as new and 
independent offices.  Additional DNA functions 
can include identifying potential CDM projects, 
financing such projects and promoting the 
CDM.  In considering DNA structuring it 
is important that Host Countries prioritize 
impartiality, transparency and efficiency for LoA 
issuance processes.
Beyond the basic domestic legal frameworks 
prescribed by the CDM Rules, Host Countries 
are free to introduce additional domestic laws 
specifically regulating CDM activities within 
their jurisdictions.  Laws already enacted 
govern: the terms and type of involvement 
of Host Country entities in CDM projects; 
investment in and ownership of CDM projects; 
taxation regimes for CDM projects; and the 
price at which CERs generated by CDM projects 
in the relevant Host Country can be sold.  It 
is important that such laws be suitable and 
appropriate to the existing laws and other 
relevant circumstances of the Host Country.
The domestic law of Host Countries can impact 
on the additionality of potential CDM projects.  
Where a Host Country domestic law mandates 
or requires action to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, this can undermine the 
demonstration of additionality by removing or 
undermining the importance of CER revenue to 
the success of such measures.  This can result in 
perverse incentives for Host Countries to avoid 
implementing laws to reduce emissions, or 
laws which encourage activities which actually 
increase emissions.  It is therefore important to 
understand the impacts that domestic laws and 
policies may have on additionality.  
A further point of interplay between the CDM 
Rules and domestic laws and policies is in 
Programmatic CDM, in which groups of CDM 
activities are grouped together and registered 
as a single Program of Activities (POA) or 
“Programmatic” CDM project.  Programmatic 
CDM can help remove regulatory and cost 
barriers that would otherwise restrict small-
scale CDM project activities. PoAs are led 
by government authorities or private entities 
responsible for introducing and implementing 
the relevant policy or standard.
Many Host Countries have already taken steps 
to identify and remove existing laws that could 
impact on CDM project development.  This is 
discussed in chapter 5.  Such laws include those 
governing: project assessment and approval; 
title to the land on which CDM projects are 
developed; (foreign) investment; resources to 
be exploited by such projects (e.g. renewable 
energy); securities and financial products; 
public sector transparency; employment 
and labour; and the use and trade of project 
outputs.  Host Countries should consider what 
alterations to domestic legal frameworks could 
remove barriers to CDM projects and open the 
way for greater carbon investments.  Domestic 
laws of particular relevance are examined in 
chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Chapter 6 explores ways in which domestic 
property laws can impact on legal entitlements 
to the property assets which underlie 
CDM projects.  The Guidebook argues that 
domestic property laws that clearly define 
and adequately protect property rights of 
participants in CDM projects will give project 
developers and investors confidence that their 
projects can be successfully implemented and 
that project outputs and returns can be secured 
appropriately.  This is particularly true of CERs, 
which while defined under international law as 
internationally tradeable units, are often not 
explicitly defined under Host Country property 
laws.  Uncertain domestic legal treatment of 
13
title to CERs and the GHG emission reductions 
that underpin them would heighten the legal 
risks associated with CDM investment.  
Other domestic property law issues which can 
affect CDM projects include:
rights and title to revenues from the •	
sale of CERs, including domestic legal 
presumptions (e.g. a presumption that 
such CERs are the property of the State 
or the owner of the land upon which the 
CDM project is situated);
rights, conditions or restrictions with •	
respect to the land on which CDM projects 
are built and operated by Annex I or other 
foreign entities (including customary land 
title and restrictions on foreign ownership 
of such assets);
the extent to which project participants •	
and other parties can use contracts 
to allocate title to CERs and project 
assets (including in relation to carbon 
sequestration rights for forestry projects); 
and
whether, and under what conditions, some •	
or all of the CERs or other CDM project 
assets may be expropriated by the Host 
Country (including compensation to the 
owners of compulsorily acquired assets).
 
Participants in CDM projects have developed a 
number of ways to minimize the risks posed by 
legal uncertainty in these areas. These strategies 
range from ensuring that the treatment of 
title to CERs is clearly structured in emission 
reduction purchase agreements (ERPAs) 
to developing joint venture structures to 
maximize the value that can be extracted from 
CDM projects in jurisdictions where foreign 
ownership restrictions apply.
Taxation and financial services regulations also 
impact on CDM projects.  This is examined in 
chapter 7 of the Guidebook.  The CDM Rules 
do not explicitly deal with the status of CERs as 
a security or commodity and this, together with 
taxation relevant to CERs, is left to domestic 
legislation.  Four key issues relevant to CDM 
projects are governed by taxation and financial 
services regulation:
whether a CER generated from the •	
project will be treated as a security or 
a commodity (this is important because 
securities trading is often regulated more 
stringently than commodities trading, 
producing higher transaction costs for 
market participants);
foreign exchange controls applicable •	
to CER transactions (which is highly 
jurisdiction-specific);
taxation of CER transactions (including •	
taxation concessions and incentives; 
taxation on revenues from CER sales and 
through indirect taxes such as goods and 
services or value-added taxes); 
whether projects are subject to foreign •	
direct investment restrictions or special 
legal protections; and
CER pricing controls, under which •	
proposed projects only receive Host 
Country approval if its CERs are sold above 
a floor price.
 
Domestic environmental laws can also 
impact on CDM projects.  This is dealt with 
in chapter 8 of the Guidebook.  In most 
Host Countries, major infrastructure projects 
more typical of CDM projects are subject 
to environmental and planning approval 
processes.  These are usually entirely separate 
from the Host Country approval processes 
applied by Host Countries in accordance with 
the CDM Rules.  In order to minimize costs and 
delays associated with such approvals, it can be 
advantageous for Host Countries to coordinate 
the timing of domestic processes with those 
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required under the CDM Rules.  Three key 
elements of domestic environmental regulation 
are:
the necessity for environmental impact •	
assessments and if relevant whether these 
are required for all components and stages 
of a CDM project;
environmental approvals required for project •	
construction and operation and whether and 
when such approvals must be renewed; and
the liability of CDM project participants for •	
environmental harms caused by the project.
 
As with any other project, CDM projects are 
subject to a range of project risks.  These risks 
arise in part from the domestic legal issues 
discussed above.  Additional risks, and the 
ways in which they are customarily managed by 
project participants, are outlined in Chapter 9.  
Project development agreements generally 
clearly define the ownership of CDM project 
assets and CERs, to minimize the risk of disputes 
between project participants or competing claims 
over these assets.  The structures envisaged 
in these agreements generally fall into three 
main categories, all of which involve different 
distributions of rights and obligations between 
Annex I and Host Country project participants.  
Under a Project Development Agreement 
structure, an Annex I entity will usually be 
involved in the design and development of 
a CDM project at an early stage, usually in 
exchange for rights to sell (often with revenue 
sharing arrangements) all or a majority of CERs.  
Under an ERPA developer structure, the Annex I 
party will also be involved in the development 
of the CDM project but will usually purchase the 
CERs generated under a separate ERPA.  Finally, 
under an ERPA offtake structure, a Host Country 
party will usually retain control over the design 
and implementation of the project while the 
role of the Annex I entity will be limited to 
purchasing CERs from the project.
Other relevant contracting issues include:
whether CERs are sold and purchased on •	
a spot basis (transferred immediately upon 
or soon after ERPA execution) or under 
forward arrangements (where a stream of 
CERs is purchased over time);
whether the purchase volume is a •	
guaranteed volume of CERs, or only a 
portion of the volume generated by the 
project; 
responsibility for paying costs and liability •	
for taxes; and
the treatment of events of default and •	
disputes.
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3 Introduction to the CDM in the  
 International Climate Change Regulatory Framework
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
is one of the three flexibility mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).  The goal of the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol is to reduce the emission of GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere, in order to 
mitigate human-induced climate change.  The 
CDM was created to promote the hosting of 
GHG reduction projects by developing country 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol, using finance 
provided by developed country parties in order 
to make these projects possible. 
By enabling the implementation of GHG 
reduction projects in developing countries, 
the CDM contributes to the sustainable 
development of those countries, while also 
allowing them to contribute to the GHG 
reduction objectives of the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol.  At the same time, CDM projects 
assist developed country parties that finance 
such projects to meet their legally binding 
GHG reduction obligations, by generating 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) that 
can be used to meet their emission reduction 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol or the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme. 
The CDM was established under Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol, which was agreed upon 
in 1992. The detailed rules and modalities for 
the CDM were subsequently agreed upon by 
Kyoto Protocol parties in 2001, as part of the 
so-called Marrakesh Accords, in that same 
year, the CDM Executive Board was formed 
and began building the structure and process 
of the international CDM system.  The first 
CDM projects were officially registered with 
the Executive Board in 2004, and since then 
the number of projects in the pipeline has 
continued to grow steadily. 
The UNFCCC
The CDM forms a part of the international 
legal framework regulating anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and their mitigation, as well as global 
adaptation to climate change.  Negotiated by 
the countries participating in the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the UNFCCC provides 
the foundation for this international legal 
framework. 
The UNFCCC is specifically directed to the 
stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
Earth’s atmosphere “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”.  The UNFCCC does 
not, however, impose any quantified emission 
reduction targets or equivalent obligations 
on its Parties.  Rather, as its name suggests, 
the UNFCCC only provides a framework for 
activities addressing climate change, including 
the preparation of national GHG inventories, 
the consideration of climate change in the 
development of domestic policy, the transfer 
of technologies with which to tackle climate 
change, and the raising of awareness of climate 
change and its impacts. 
The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol’s function is described in 
the UNFCCC’s background publication, Caring 
for Climate, in the following way: the Kyoto 
Protocol supplements and strengthens the 
UNFCCC, providing a framework for remedial 
and precautionary action to tackle adverse 
effects of climate change.  The Kyoto Protocol is 
discussed in more detail below, but in brief, its 
rules focus on:
commitments, including legally binding •	
GHG emission targets and general 
commitments; 
implementation, including domestic •	
16
steps and three novel implementation 
mechanisms; 
minimizing impacts on developing •	
countries, including use of the Adaptation 
Fund; 
accounting, reporting and review, •	
including in-depth review of national 
reporting; and 
compliance, including a Compliance •	
Committee to assess and deal with 
problems. 
 
COP/MOP
The functions of the COP/MOP in relation 
to the CDM are set out in 3/CMP.1, Annex, 
paragraphs 2-4: The COP/MOP provides 
guidance to the Executive Board by taking 
decisions on: 
recommendations made by the Executive •	
Board on its rules of procedure; 
recommendations made by the Executive •	
Board, in accordance with provisions of 
decision 17/CP.7, the present annex and 
relevant decisions of the COP/MOP; and
the designation of operational entities •	
accredited by the Executive Board in 
accordance with Article 12, paragraph 5, 
and accreditation standards contained in 
appendix A below.  
The COP/MOP further: 
reviews annual reports of the Executive •	
Board; 
reviews the regional and subregional •	
distribution of designated operational 
entities and takes appropriate decisions to 
promote accreditation of such entities from 
developing country Parties;
reviews the regional and subregional •	
distribution of CDM projects with a view 
to identifying systematic or systemic 
barriers to their equitable distribution and 
takes appropriate decisions, based, inter 
alia, on a report by the Executive Board; 
and
assists in arranging funding of CDM •	
projects, as necessary (3/CMP.1, Annex, 
paragraphs 2-4). 
 
Executive Board
The Executive Board supervises the CDM, as 
set out in Article 12(4) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Its functions do not include the power to 
make decisions on the rules of the CDM.  
Outcomes of Executive Board meetings should 
be considered ‘guidance’ and subject to the 
approval of the COP/MOP.  Executive Board 
functions include:
making recommendations to the COP/•	
MOP on further modalities and procedures 
for the CDM; 
approving new baseline and monitoring •	
methodologies; 
overseeing the accreditation of designated •	
operational entities (DOEs), who actually 
validate the eligibility of, and verify the 
emission reduction performance of, CDM 
projects; 
establishing and maintaining a database •	
of approved rules, procedures and 
methodologies; and 
developing and maintaining the CDM •	
registry.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol
Legally binding, quantified emission reduction 
obligations only became part of international 
law with the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC, agreed by the 
Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997. The Kyoto 
Protocol strengthens the UNFCCC by imposing 
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quantified emission reduction obligations on 
Parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
and are included in UNFCCC Annex I (Annex I 
Parties).  These emission reductions are binding 
under public international law, and must be 
achieved during the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period, which extends from 2008 
to 2012. 
The obligations imposed by the Kyoto 
Protocol represent an average reduction in 
GHG emissions of 5.2% below 1990 emission 
levels across Annex I Parties during the first 
commitment period.  The specific emission 
reduction obligations accepted by Annex 
I Parties are, however, adapted to their 
respective circumstances, such that each 
may bind itself to an achievable target.  For 
example, the emission reduction obligations 
accepted by Canada and Japan, represent 
reductions of 6% below their respective 1990 
emission levels, whereas Australia and Iceland 
are only required to limit future increases in 
their GHG emissions, by accepting reduction 
obligations of 8% and 10% above their 1990 
emission levels, respectively. 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are not 
included in Annex I (generally developing 
country Parties) (Non-Annex I Parties) are not 
required under the Kyoto Protocol to accept 
quantified emission reduction obligations, 
reflecting the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” that underpins 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
Despite not currently having binding quantified 
emission reduction targets, Non-Annex I Parties 
must still abide by the objectives of the Kyoto 
Protocol and UNFCCC, and contribute to the 
mitigation of, and adaptation to, anthropogenic 
climate change.  Ways in which Non-Annex I 
Parties are required to contribute include:
undertaking national climate change •	
and GHG emission data collection and 
reporting; 
instituting national and regional climate •	
change mitigation and adaptation 
programs; and 
cooperating in climate change technology •	
transfer and capacity building programs. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16 
February 2005, and as at publication, had 
been ratified, approved, accepted or acceded 
to by 183 countries and 1 regional economic 
integration organization (the European 
Economic Community).  
The CDM: Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the 
CDM, and defines its purpose as being: 
to assist Parties not included in Annex I 
[to the UNFCCC] in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving 
compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3 [of the Kyoto Protocol].
The objectives of the CDM are thus threefold:
(a) to assist Non-Annex I Parties in achieving 
sustainable development;
(b) to assist Non-Annex I Parties in 
contributing to the avoidance of 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”; and
(c) to assist Annex I Parties in meeting their 
emission reduction obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol.
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The CDM achieves these objectives in the 
following ways:
The CDM enables Annex I Parties (or, as •	
is more often the case, companies from 
Annex I Parties that have been authorized 
by those Parties to participate in the CDM 
(Annex I Entities)) to provide finance 
for approved GHG reduction projects 
located within the territory of Non-Annex 
I Parties.  This finance is provided through 
the purchase by Annex I Entities of CERs 
issued on the basis of the GHG reductions 
achieved by CDM projects.  Each CER 
represents “one tonne of carbon dioxide-
equivalent sequestered or abated”. 
CERs are valuable, internationally tradeable •	
instruments that can be acquired and 
surrendered by Annex I Parties as a 
means of offsetting their domestic GHG 
emissions and thereby meeting their Kyoto 
Protocol emission reduction obligations.  
By enabling project developers and other 
project participants to generate additional 
finance for a CDM project through the 
sale of CERs, the CDM enables the 
development and implementation of 
GHG reduction projects that would not 
otherwise be viable.
GHG reductions may often be achieved •	
more cost-effectively in Non-Annex I 
Parties than Annex I Parties, as a result, 
for example, of the greater reliance of 
Non-Annex I Parties on less efficient 
technologies, and the availability of 
relatively inexpensive resources and labour 
in those countries.  This means that CDM 
projects often present relatively cost-
effective GHG reduction opportunities, 
which if captured and used to market CERs 
to Annex I Parties, can reduce the need 
for Annex I Parties to pursue relatively 
expensive domestic reduction options. 
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol’s •	
objectives, projects approved and 
implemented in accordance with 
the international CDM rules must 
demonstrably contribute to the sustainable 
development of the Non-Annex I Party 
hosting them (CDM Host Country). 
This means by not only reducing or 
sequestering their GHG emissions, but also 
by contributing to broader Host Country 
sustainable development goals.  Examples 
of ways in which CDM projects fulfill this 
requirement include creating employment, 
facilitating technology transfer, and 
enhancing the quality of, or access to, local 
infrastructure.  
By channeling finance from Annex I Parties 
to Non-Annex I Parties to enable the 
implementation of CDM projects that 
achieve cost-effective GHG reductions while 
contributing to the broader sustainable 
development of Host Countries, and allowing 
those GHG reductions to be used by Annex I 
Parties to comply with their Kyoto Protocol 
commitments, the CDM is able to achieve each 
of the objectives set out above.  
The UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline contains the 
most extensive and widely utilized database 
on CDM projects and CER issuances. The 
database is free and accessible online at http://
cdmpipeline.org
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4 Host Country Compliance and Domestic Legal   
 Requirements under the CDM Rules
The Relationship between the 
CDM Rules and Domestic Law
 
As with other international legal instruments, 
the CDM impacts upon, and is impacted by, 
the domestic laws of the Parties seeking to 
make use of it.  Non-Annex I Parties wishing to 
host CDM projects (i.e. CDM Host Countries), 
and Annex I Parties seeking to authorize 
participation in CDM projects, must ensure that 
their domestic laws: 
comply with the domestic legal •	
requirements imposed by the CDM; and 
do not (inadvertently or otherwise) impede •	
or preclude the effective participation of 
those Parties in the CDM.  
The relationship between the international 
CDM Rules and domestic law is particularly 
complex in the case of Non-Annex I Parties.  
In order to successfully host a CDM project, a 
Host Country’s domestic law must provide for: 
national assent or approval of CDM •	
projects proposed for implementation, in 
accordance with the international rules; 
and
a regulatory environment in which the •	
project can be successfully implemented. 
 
This chapter discusses the legal requirements 
under the CDM Rules with which Host 
Countries must comply in order to successfully 
implement CDM projects, and generate project 
finance through the sale of CERs. 
Host Country Compliance with the 
CDM: Domestic Legal Requirements
In order to implement CDM projects, CDM 
Host Countries must first comply with a number 
of basic participation requirements.  These 
requirements are set out in the CDM Rules, 
and in particular in COP/MOP decision 3/
CMP.1 Modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism as defined in Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM Modalities).  The 
requirements extend from the initial agreement 
to be legally bound by the Kyoto Protocol, 
through to the establishment of dedicated 
domestic structures, and procedures in order to 
give effect to the CDM within the jurisdiction 
of a Non-Annex I Party. 
The participation requirements set out in 
the CDM Modalities typically incorporate 
a domestic legal element, requiring the 
introduction by Non-Annex I Parties of a 
specific domestic legal measure in order to 
achieve compliance.  The specific participation 
requirements in the CDM Modalities, and the 
associated domestic legal requirements, are 
outlined below. 
Ratifying the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
International Rule: Becoming a Party to 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol  
The CDM Modalities provide that “[a] Party 
not included in Annex I may participate in 
a CDM project if it is a Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol”. 
Thus, first and foremost among the 
participation requirements for hosting 
CDM projects set out in the international 
CDM Rules is the need to have ratified, 
or otherwise agreed to be bound by, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
In order to become a Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, a country must, in exercise of its 
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sovereignty under international law and in 
accordance with its own domestic laws, have:
ratified or otherwise agreed to be bound •	
by the UNFCCC, as the international legal 
framework of which the Kyoto Protocol 
forms a part; and
ratified or otherwise agreed to be bound •	
by the Kyoto Protocol specifically.  
Countries may agree to be bound by the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol by depositing 
with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, acting as Depositary, an instrument 
of ratification, accession, acceptance or 
approval of the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol, as 
appropriate.
The requirement that a country be a Party to 
the Kyoto Protocol in order to participate in the 
CDM applies equally to Annex I Parties seeking 
to authorize participation of Annex I Project 
Participants in CDM projects as it does to Non-
Annex I Parties seeking to host those projects.  
At the time of publication, only a small number 
of States who are Parties to the UNFCCC have 
not also signed or ratified the Kyoto Protocol: 
Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, San 
Marino, and Zimbabwe.  With Kazakhstan’s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in March 
2009, the USA is now the only signatory to the 
Protocol not having ratified the instrument.
Investors should ensure that this process 
has been satisfactorily completed in those 
jurisdictions where national constitutions 
or other founding documents require the 
enactment of domestic legislation in order to 
implement ratified international instruments.
Establishing a Designated National Authority
International Rule: Establishing a 
Designated National Authority 
 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol—whether 
or not they are included in Annex I—are 
required under the CDM Modalities to 
“designate a national authority for the 
CDM”. 
 
The national authorities designated by a 
Non-Annex I Party play a vital role in the 
implementation of CDM projects, most 
importantly by assessing and approving 
proposed CDM projects.  
The CDM Modalities provide limited guidance 
on the establishment, responsibilities and 
functions of the national CDM authorities 
required to be established under the CDM Rules 
(known as Designated National Authorities or 
DNAs).  The CDM Modalities do, however, 
specify that DNAs of Non-Annex I Parties must 
approve CDM projects hosted by those Parties, 
by issuing written approval for those projects. 
These approvals must confirm that: 
participation in the proposed CDM project •	
is voluntary; and
implementation of the proposed CDM •	
project will contribute to the Host 
Country’s sustainable development (in 
accordance with the broader objectives of 
the CDM). 
Thus, prospective CDM Host Countries must 
establish a DNA capable of approving proposed 
CDM projects in the terms set out above.  The 
implications of the need to establish a DNA 
mandated to assess and approve CDM projects 
are discussed below. 
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As previously mentioned, neither the CDM 
Modalities nor the international CDM Rules 
more broadly provide detailed guidance on the 
establishment and functions of DNAs.  These 
issues are instead left to the discretion of 
individual CDM Host Countries. 
DNAs may be established in a variety of 
ways, for example through the enactment of 
legislation, and may take a variety of forms, 
for example an inter-governmental committee.  
Whichever approach is adopted, it is important 
that a DNA can:
elaborate its decisions and administrative •	
procedures based on a sound legal 
foundation and institutional mandate;
act as a clear point of contact for entities •	
wishing to investigate or pursue CDM 
projects in the country;
approve proposed CDM projects fairly, •	
effectively and efficiently; and
facilitate intergovernmental coordination •	
and decision-making to ensure that 
appropriate CDM polices are adopted and 
implemented to fully harness a country’s 
CDM potential.
 
In general terms, it is important that the DNA 
be able to fulfill these functions in a clear and 
transparent manner. This is integral not only 
to the administration of CDM activities in 
Host Countries but also to building investor 
confidence, and therefore encouraging 
investment, in such activities.
It is also important that the DNA be 
proactive in reviewing and regularly 
updating its procedures to enhance the local 
implementation of CDM projects.
A number of different DNA structures have 
been adopted by CDM Host Countries and 
there is no “one-size-fits-all” model.  The 
size and functional scope of DNAs varies 
considerably between Parties.  Some examples 
of DNA structures that have been adopted are 
set out below.
DNA within an Existing Government 
Department or Ministry
The majority of DNAs are set up within an 
existing government department, often 
the department of environment, energy, 
infrastructure or foreign trade and investment. 
A number of Host Countries have appointed 
the national department or ministry responsible 
for the environment to act as DNA.  For 
example, the Vietnamese DNA (the National 
Office for Climate Change and Ozone 
Protection) has been constituted within the 
International Cooperation Department of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 
and Malaysia has also appointed the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment as its DNA. 
Nonetheless, it is by no means obligatory 
when appointing an existing department or 
ministry as DNA to select the department 
or ministry responsible for the environment, 
and the role may equally be performed by 
authorities responsible for international trade, 
finance, natural resources, energy or foreign 
affairs, provided the authority selected has the 
relevant expertise and governmental mandate.  
In South Africa, for example, the DNA was 
originally set up within the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), 
but the Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DME) subsequently agreed with DEAT to 
take over the role of DNA.  The new DNA was 
officially established in December 2004 and 
the corresponding regulations published in July 
2005.  
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DNA as an Inter-Ministerial Committee
Some DNAs are formed as inter-ministerial 
committees.  This model facilitates whole of 
government coordination, meaning that any 
necessary inter-departmental requirements and 
approvals can be readily obtained.  
In some countries, the DNA itself is a discrete 
body within a government department, but 
is established simply to process applications 
and forward them to an inter-ministerial 
committee which conducts the full assessment.  
Government departments that are typically 
represented on these committees include 
energy, environment, transport, agriculture, 
mining and resources, meteorology, foreign 
trade and investment, treasury and the 
Attorney-General’s department.
Brazil, for example, has constituted the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Global 
Climate Change to act as the country’s DNA.  
A Presidential Decree commissioned this 
committee in 1999, making Brazil one of the 
first developing nations to establish a DNA.  
The Decree establishes that the Committee will 
approve CDM projects and is also responsible 
for the definition of additional eligibility criteria 
beyond those rules established under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
Currently, the Brazilian DNA includes 
many ministries, including the Minister of 
Science and Technology, the Minister of the 
Environment and members of the Foreign 
Relations, Agriculture Livestock and Supply, 
Transportation, Mines and Energy and 
Development Industry and Foreign Trade 
Ministries, as well as the Chief of Staff of the 
Presidency of the Republic.
Another example of this model is China’s 
DNA, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), which approves Chinese 
CDM projects in consultation with the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), based 
on the assessment results of the National 
CDM Project Examination Board set up by 
the National Coordination Committee on 
Climate Change.  The Board itself is co-
chaired by NDRC and MOST, and consists of 
representatives from seven relevant government 
agencies: NDRC; MOST; MOFA; Ministry of 
Finance; Ministry of Environmental Protection; 
China Meteorological Bureau; and the Ministry 
of Agriculture.
DNA as a New and Independent Office
Host Countries may also establish an entirely 
new, separate office to act as its DNA, as is the 
case in Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s DNA, the National Commission for 
Clean Development Mechanism (NC-CDM), 
was established by Decree No. 206 of the 
Indonesian Ministry of Environment passed 
on 21 July 2005, and operates as a “one-stop 
shop” for investment in CDM projects. The 
NC-CDM comprises members and a chair 
drawn from relevant government ministries, 
as well as a secretariat, an expert group, 
a technical team and a stakeholder forum 
encompassing local government, private sector 
representatives and NGOs. The NC-CDM is 
supported by the Research and Development 
Centre for Energy and Electricity within the 
Ministry of Mineral and Energy Resources, 
which assists in the assessment of CDM projects 
proposed in the energy sector, including 
through the development and application of 
sector-specific sustainable development criteria.
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Additional Functions for DNAs
The CDM Rules do not place any restrictions 
on the functions and responsibilities that 
non-Annex I Parties allocate to DNAs through 
its domestic laws.  Non-Annex I Parties are free 
to go beyond the minimum requirements set 
out in the CDM Rules with respect to DNAs, 
and to authorize their DNAs to take a more 
proactive role in the CDM process. For example, 
DNAs could consider actively promoting the 
implementation of CDM projects in their 
respective countries by:
assisting in the identification of investment •	
opportunities or in the prioritization of 
investment sectors;
coordinating the development of a portfolio •	
of priority projects and networking 
information for marketing CDM activities 
and promoting CDM opportunities with 
trading partners;
linking local CER sellers with foreign •	
purchasers;
facilitating and coordinating the •	
implementation of  CDM capacity building 
programs to enhance local knowledge and 
interest in the CDM;
monitoring the sustainable development •	
impacts of CDM projects under 
implementation, and reporting on national 
CDM programs to national policymakers;
working with other government bodies •	
to remove domestic legal and regulatory 
barriers to CDM projects, and to ensure 
that CDM project approval processes are as 
transparent and efficient as possible; and
coordinating internal climate change policy •	
and developing positions for international 
climate change negotiations. 
DNA engagement in a broader range of 
Host Country CDM processes is likely to 
reduce domestic legal barriers to CDM 
project implementation within Host Country 
governmental structures, and reduce any 
perceived risk associated with the DNA and its 
performance of its functions. This engagement 
entails building relationships between the DNA 
and relevant stakeholders, including foreign 
investors, and making the responsibilities and 
work of the DNA more transparent. By reducing 
perceived risks associated with its DNA, 
particularly in relation to transparency, a Host 
Country can increase confidence among potential 
investors, and ultimately may increase the level 
of investment and activity in the Host Country. 
For example, some Host Countries have been 
encouraged to establish financial mechanisms to 
help project developers meet the initial upfront 
costs of preparing a Project Idea Note (PIN) and 
Project Design Document (PDD).  Argentina, for 
example, established the Argentine Carbon Fund 
for this purpose.  Although such mechanisms 
would reduce transaction costs and risks of 
developing CDM projects in the relevant 
country, it would be important that the DNA 
disregard this financial support when assessing 
projects for approval.  Any bias by a DNA 
towards such projects could deter other project 
developers from submitting PINs and PDDs that 
had been independently financed. This would 
substantially hinder, rather than promote, CDM 
activities in the country.  It is recommended that 
potential situations of conflict of interest such 
as this be avoided; thus some DNAs have clearly 
divided roles such that one agency has unique 
responsibility for promoting CDM projects 
while a second agency is solely responsible 
for regulating (i.e., assessing and approving) 
CDM project activities.  For example, in Peru 
the Ministry for Environment (MINAM) is now 
the DNA, while another agency, the National 
Fund for the Environment (FONAM) has been 
designated as the agency responsible for 
promoting CDM project development.
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CDM Approval Criteria
Prospective CDM Host Countries must establish 
CDM project approval procedures incorporating 
sustainable development criteria, by which 
they can independently assess and approve 
proposed projects.  The transparent and timely 
application of those processes to proposed 
CDM project activities can increase investor 
confidence and help promote investment 
in, and the implementation of, CDM project 
activities within that country.
The international CDM Rules do not impose 
any restrictions or requirements on the 
project approval criteria adopted by Host 
Countries.  Each therefore has the ability 
to define its own approval procedures and 
sustainable development criteria, and this task 
is typically delegated to the DNA.  Typically, 
project approval processes and sustainable 
development criteria address the broader 
objectives of the CDM, including:
contribution to economic growth;(a) 
contribution to technology transfer; and(b) 
contribution to skills transfer, learning   (c) 
 and employment.
Issuing LoAs
Once a DNA has determined that a proposed 
CDM project satisfies the Host Country’s 
CDM approval criteria, the DNA is required, 
under the CDM Rules and in accordance 
with common practice, to issue an LoA 
for the project in the terms set out above.  
Issuance of an LoA is in turn a pre-requisite 
to the registration of that project by the CDM 
Executive Board as a CDM project.
It should be noted, however, that beyond 
satisfaction of the basic requirements set out in 
the CDM Rules (see above), LoAs can provide a 
useful tool with which to address key issues and 
risks associated with CDM projects, and thereby 
increase investor confidence and interest in 
CDM processes and activities within the relevant 
Host Country. 
LoAs may, for example, address the issue of 
legal title to the GHG reductions and associated 
CERs that will be achieved by the approved 
project.  Where several parties are involved 
in the development and implementation of a 
CDM project, it may be unclear which of the 
parties has prima facie legal title to the GHG 
reductions and CERs generated by the project 
under the domestic laws of the Host Country.  
In this context, some countries have discussed 
allowing the sharing of CERs among investors 
in proportion to their financial contributions.  
There is no commonly accepted formula for such 
sharing, however.
The LoA may, for example, provide a 
confirmation from the Host Country DNA 
that legal title to the GHG reductions and/or 
associated CERs generated by a CDM project 
vests in a particular Project Participant.  This will 
provide increased certainty as to which party 
has title to CERs upon their issuance, and is 
therefore in a position to transfer this title to a 
purchaser of the CERs. 
By way of illustration, LoAs issued by the South 
African DNA state that:
the Republic of South Africa owns all GHG (a) 
emission reductions generated by CDM 
projects implemented in South Africa; and
on this basis, the Project Participant named (b) 
as such in the LoA is authorized by the DNA 
to: 
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International Rule: Developing CDM project 
approval criteria and Issuing Letters of 
Approval
The CDM Modalities require that Host 
Countries:
assess CDM project activities proposed to •	
be implemented within their jurisdiction 
using approval criteria and procedures, 
including criteria with which to verify that 
implementation of the proposed project 
will assist the Host Country in achieving 
sustainable development; and
once a project has been approved in •	
accordance with the relevant criteria and 
procedures, issue written approval for the 
project.
Thus, Host Countries must develop their own set 
of criteria, tests and standards with which their 
DNAs (the authorities responsible for issuing 
approvals) can determine whether a particular 
project will, among other things, contribute 
adequately to the Host Country’ sustainable 
development.
Host Country DNAs must be mandated to 
prepare and issue written approval for projects 
that meet the applicable approval criteria.  
Current prevailing practice is for the DNA to 
issue a Letter of Approval (LoA) with respect to 
the proposed CDM project activity.
The CDM Rules require Host Country DNAs to 
confirm in their LoAs that:
the Host Country has ratified the Kyoto •	
Protocol;
the Host Country’s participation in the •	
proposed CDM project is voluntary; and
implementation of the proposed CDM •	
project will contribute to its sustainable 
development.
Approving CDM Projects
take ownership of the GHG reductions (i) 
achieved by the relevant project once 
they have in fact been achieved; and
sell the rights and title to those GHG (ii) 
reductions. 
This explicit clarification naming the Project 
Participant who owns the CERs issued with 
respect to the project, and is entitled to 
sell such CERs, resolves any confusion or 
competition as to which party has title.  It 
will also enable the named entity to warrant 
in any sale contract that the entity has full 
legal and beneficial title to the CERs, and will 
be able to transfer such title to the purchaser 
in accordance with the agreed contractual 
terms.  CER purchasers typically require such 
a warranty when entering into transactions, so 
the existence of a clear legal basis upon which 
a seller can make such a warranty will give 
both parties substantially greater comfort when 
transacting CERs. 
Some DNAs issue LoAs giving only conditional 
approval to putative CDM activities.  The Indian 
DNA, for example, has attached conditions to 
some LoAs that it has issued. The Validation 
and Verification Manual (VVM) requires DOEs 
to determine whether such conditions have 
been imposed by the relevant DNA when 
undertaking validations.
DNA procedures, most critically the time 
delays for obtaining final LoAs, can influence 
the attractiveness of Host Countries for CDM 
investment. A track record revealing irregularity 
or frequent delays in LoA issuances can 
discourage such investment, while in contrast 
rapid and transparent LoA approval processes 
will encourage such investment.
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Malaysia CDM approval criteria
The Malaysian CDM approval criteria as set out on the website of the DNA in order 
to make them accessible and transparent to prospective project developers, provide a 
good practice example of  clear, rigorous criteria used to assess proposed CDM projects 
The criteria that must be met by proposed CDM projects in order to be implemented in 
Malaysia are :
The project must support Malaysia’s sustainable development policies, and contribute (a) 
to sustainable development in Malaysia both directly and indirectly, in the relevant 
sector and in the broader Malaysian economy.
The proposed CDM project must involve one or more Annex I Parties.  For the (b) 
purposes of this criterion, an Annex I Party can be an Annex I Party national 
government or a private / public entity from an Annex I Party.  An Annex I Party is 
considered to participate in a project if:
(i)   the Annex I Party buys CERs from the project, and provides equity and 
technology for the project;
(ii)  the Annex I Party buys CERs from the project, and provides equity for the 
project; or
(iii) the Annex I Party buys CERs from the project, and provides technology for the 
project.
The proposed project must provide technology transfer benefits and/or improvement (c) 
in technology in accordance with the  following:
(i) technology transfer and/or improvement in technology include both 
technology software and hardware;
(ii) CDM projects should lead to transfer of environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how;
(iii) improvement in technology implies that the project applies a technology that 
is more efficient and less carbon intensive than existing technologies;
(iv) the technology transferred and/or the relevant improvements in technology 
should support Malaysia’s sustainable development objectives; and
(v) the technology transfer and/or improvement in technology should enhance 
the indigenous capacity of Malaysians to apply, develop and implement 
environmentally sound technologies.
The proposed CDM project must fulfill all conditions contained in the CDM Rules, (d) 
being that:
(i) participation in the project is voluntary;
(ii) the project will achieve real, measurable and long-term benefits related to 
mitigation of climate change; and
(iii) the GHG reductions achieved by the project will be additional to any that 
would occur in the absence of the project.
The project proponent should demonstrate its ability to implement the proposed (e) 
CDM project, by providing evidence of:
(i) incorporation of a local company with minimum paid-up capital of 100,000 
Malaysian Ringgits; and
(ii) other likely sources of financing the project.
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Revoking LoAs
Just as the process of obtaining an LoA to 
participate in CDM projects is a matter of 
domestic law, so too are the rules governing 
a DNA’s right to revoke an LoA presumed to 
be a domestic rather than an international 
legal issue. This is due to the fact that the 
international CDM Rules do not specify any 
right for a Party to revoke an LoA, nor do they 
appear to contemplate such a course of action. 
Thus, the CDM Executive Board has confirmed 
that the notification of such a revocation after 
a project’s registration would not affect its 
registration status. Conversely, the CDM rules 
do not expressly preclude LoA revocation, 
either. There is therefore some ambiguity as to 
the effect or impact of a DNA’s LoA revocation 
on a particular project.  
Under Brazilian law, for example, the Brazilian 
DNA can cancel or revoke an LoA if new 
evidence of illegality or acts contrary to the 
public interest come to light after its issuance.  
The Brazilian DNA has confirmed that it would 
contemplate using this mechanism only in 
special cases.  
If a Host Country objected to the continuation 
of a CDM project and sought to revoke 
the LoA, however, it could potentially take 
domestic legal action to make it illegal for the 
project participants to operate the project. For 
example,  an injunction or court order against 
further implementation of the project could 
be obtained.  This would effectively compel 
the project developer to cease operations, 
and thereby terminate the generation of CERs.  
Such action could expose a Host Country to 
litigation seeking to prevent revocation of the 
LOA or to administrative law remedies, and 
could also reduce its attractiveness as a foreign 
investment destination. 
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Supplementary Domestic CDM Laws
Beyond the basic domestic legal requirements 
imposed by the CDM Rules, potential CDM 
Host Countries are free to introduce additional 
domestic laws, policies and instruments 
specifically regulating CDM activities within 
their jurisdictions (Supplementary CDM Laws).  
Many Host Countries have implemented such 
supplementary laws, with the expressed intent 
of facilitating or promoting the implementation 
of CDM projects.  These Supplementary CDM 
laws may also, however, impose additional 
requirements upon CDM projects, in that they 
ensure that those projects achieve particular 
outcomes or benefits.  Examples of such 
requirements include regulation of the types of 
CDM projects that may be implemented within 
the Host Country, or the ways in which Annex 
I Entities can invest in, or purchase CERs from, 
such projects. 
Supplementary CDM Laws may take a variety 
of forms, and encompass a broad range of 
laws and policies.  Examples already in effect 
globally include:
Laws governing Host Country involvement in 
CDM projects
 Host Countries may enact laws regulating 
the nature and extent that certain 
Host Country entities may have in 
CDM projects implemented within the 
country.  For example, Indonesia’s forestry 
regulatory framework effectively limits 
which Indonesian entity can apply for 
an LoA in respect of a forestry project 
on a state-owned forest area.  This is 
due to an Indonesian Supplementary 
CDM law stipulating that in order for an 
Indonesian entity to obtain an LoA for 
an afforestation/reforestation project in 
such areas, the entity must first obtain a 
letter of endorsement for the project from 
the Ministry of Forestry.  The Ministry of 
Forestry will in turn only issue this letter 
to an entity holding (i) a Utilization of 
Environmental Services License (known as 
an “IUPHJL”) or (ii) an Industrial Timber 
Estate Logging Concession (known as an 
“IUPHHK-HTI”).
Laws governing (whether restricting or 
facilitating) foreign investment in, or ownership 
of, CDM projects 
 China, for example, has introduced a 
Supplementary CDM Law stating that 
“Chinese funded or Chinese-holding 
enterprises within the territory of China 
are eligible to conduct CDM projects with 
foreign partners”.  This rule requires that 
any entity seeking to implement a CDM 
project in China must be either:
wholly Chinese-owned; or•	
one in which another Chinese entity •	
has a controlling interest.  
 In Indonesia, no foreign investment 
is permitted in power projects with a 
capacity of less than 10MW.  Accordingly, 
foreigners cannot invest in small-scale 
renewable power projects.
 In some cases, for example in Uganda, 
laws governing foreign investment have 
been reviewed or amended following the 
introduction of potential CDM activities in 
order to address CDM-specific investment 
incentives or disincentives.
Laws establishing a special taxation regime 
for CDM projects and associated revenue and 
expenditures  
 The fee imposed by the Government 
of Vietnam on the sale of CERs from 
Vietnamese CDM projects effectively 
functions as a CDM-specific fiscal regime. 
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Introduced under a Supplementary CDM 
Law, the regime (discussed in detail 
in section 7) requires owners of CERs 
generated by Vietnamese projects that sell 
the CERs to foreign buyers, or who remit 
CERs abroad in order to fulfil their emission 
reduction obligations, to pay a fee on this 
sale/remittance. The fee is calculated on 
the basis of the volume of CERs sold, the 
sale price of the CERs, and the type of 
CDM project that generated the CERs. A 
similar model is under consideration by the 
Tanzanian DNA.
 Malaysia, on the other hand, has 
established an income tax exemption for 
income received from the sale of CERs, and 
deductions may be claimed for expenditure 
incurred for the purpose of obtaining the 
CERs. South Africa is designing a similar tax 
incentive scheme (see details in section 7).
Laws providing particular benefits or concessions 
with respect to particular CDM project types 
Several Host Countries have enacted 
Supplementary CDM Laws that aim to support 
or prioritize specific project types or sectors, such 
as renewable energy and energy efficiency, coal 
mine methane and forestry projects. These laws 
may provide for measures such as special tax 
concessions, simplified approval procedures and 
government grants.  Policies regulating the sale 
price of CERs generated by projects within the 
Host Country 
 Host Countries are free to regulate the 
minimum sale price applicable to CERs 
or ERUs, as the case may be. The classic 
example is China’s floor pricing policy, 
discussed in further detail in section 8. 
Where such steps are taken, it is important 
that the floor price can change to 
accommodate shifts in the prevailing  
market price (e.g. if the market price drops 
below the floor price then the Host Country 
should be able to quickly and transparently 
lower the floor price).  Host Countries also 
need to be aware of the potential for a 
floor price to effectively set a fixed price 
at which CERs from projects within the 
country will always be sold.
Policies with regard to the type and terms of 
involvement of Annex I Entities in CDM projects 
within the relevant Host Country, for example the 
national eligibility of so-called “unilateral CDM” 
projects (i.e., those implemented without an 
Annex I entity named as a project participant at 
the time of registration) .
 Malaysia’s CDM approval criteria stipulate 
that LoAs can only be issued to projects 
involving one or more Annex I Party.  
Although expressed in Malaysia’s project 
approval criteria (as required under the 
international CDM Rules), this policy 
represents a de facto CDM Supplementary 
law adopted by Malaysia, independently of 
the CDM Rules.
The enactment of Supplementary CDM Laws 
generally represents an effective means of 
promoting the implementation of CDM 
projects in a Host Country.  Most obviously, 
the enactment of laws granting benefits or 
concessions to CDM projects may mean that 
CDM projects within that Host Country are 
given relatively favorable regulatory treatment 
compared to other potential Host Countries, 
thereby increasing their ability to compete for 
and secure investment.  Host Countries must, 
however, ensure that in drafting and enacting 
such laws they do not inadvertently undermine 
the CDM eligibility of the projects they are 
seeking to support, by mitigating their ability 
to satisfy the requirement of additionality.  This 
issue is discussed in detail below, in section 4. 
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Case Study: Regulating and promoting CDM projects
Brazil: Mechanisms for financing CDM projects and activities
Brazil’s Federal Government has instituted the following financing and credit 
mechanisms designed to encourage the development of CDM projects:
The Support Program for CDM Projects ((a) Programa de Apoio a Projetos do 
Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo - Pró-MDL).  This program, which is 
run by the Agency for Study and Project Finance (Financiadora de Estudos e 
Projetos - FINEP), finances pre-investment CDM activities as well as scientific 
and technological development efforts directed to the CDM, through 
reimbursable and non-reimbursable finance.
The Clean Development Program run by the National Bank for Economic and (b) 
Social Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Social - BNDES) 
provides for the creation of investment funds to support CDM projects (with 
returns for investors generated from the sale of CERs).
BNDES also provides an Environmental Credit Line, designed to support (c) 
feasibility studies for proposed CDM projects, and meet the costs of 
preparing PDDs, taking projects through the validation and registration 
process.
The Brazilian Government has also launched a National Plan on Global Climate 
Change (NPGCC) (Plano Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima – PNMC) through the 
Interministerial Committee on Climate Change (ICCC) (Comitê Interministerial 
sobre Mudança do Clima - CIMC) which services to reinforce the above financial 
support mechanisms.  These mechanisms improve the ability of CDM project 
developers to secure the finance necessary to develop and implement CDM 
projects, but do not impose any obligation to actually implement specific 
projects or undertake particular activities.  There is therefore no risk of 
these measures undermining the ability of Brazilian CDM projects to satisfy 
additionality criteria.
Vietnam: investment incentives for CDM projects
Decision No. 130/2007/QD-TTg issued by the Vietnamese Prime Minister 
on 2 August 2007 establishes a number of incentives designed to encourage 
investment in CDM projects.  These do not incorporate any obligation to 
undertake particular projects or activities, and so will not prevent proposed 
Vietnamese CDM projects from meeting additionality requirements.  The 
available incentives include:
fiscal concessions including exemptions from land use rents and levies, and •	
accelerated depreciation;
access to state investment credit;•	
price subsidies for CDM project outputs; and•	
priority consumption of CDM project outputs over similar outputs produced •	
by non-CDM activities.
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Supplementary CDM Laws that restrict or 
otherwise impose particular requirements 
on CDM projects, while not providing direct 
incentives to implement CDM projects within 
the relevant Host Country, often provide 
certainty as to how those projects will be 
regulated, and the steps that must be taken to 
implement them successfully.  This certainty 
may increase investor understanding of, and 
confidence in, the CDM regulatory environment 
within the Host Country, and reduce perceived 
risk associated with Host Country regulatory 
structures and processes. By reducing risk 
in this way, Supplementary CDM Laws that 
restrict rather than facilitate the implementation 
of CDM projects may nonetheless serve to 
promote CDM investment and activities, and 
reduce legal barriers to such activities.  
Regardless of the motivation for enacting 
Supplementary CDM Laws, it is important 
that CDM Host Countries ensure that they are 
suitable and appropriate to existing laws and 
other local circumstances.  Approaches adopted 
by one Host Country will not necessarily 
be appropriate for another due to different 
environmental, social, economic and legal 
circumstances and norms. 
 
Additionality 
If the implementation of a particular project 
or type of project is mandatory under the 
domestic law of a Host Country, then a 
proposed CDM project of that type cannot be 
considered additional, at least for the purposes 
of demonstrating additionality under the CDM 
Rules.  This is because the project would have 
been implemented in order to comply with 
the relevant law, even without registration 
as a CDM project.  The test of whether a 
project is required to be implemented under 
applicable domestic law is a key criterion 
to be satisfied in the demonstration of 
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Case Study: Landfill gas capture requirements in Mexico
In Mexico, Official Standard NOM-083-SEMARNAT-2003 introduced by 
the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources requires landfill 
operators to capture GHGs (i.e. methane) emitted from landfills (there is, 
however, no obligation to flare captured landfill gas).  As a result, in order 
to satisfy additionality, CDM project developers seeking to develop landfill 
gas capture projects in Mexico have been required to demonstrate that 
this Official Standard is not mandatory in the municipality in which the 
proposed project is to be located. 
In most instances, the DOE performing the validation of a proposed 
project will review the applicable requirements at the municipal level, in 
order to confirm that the Official Standard is in fact not mandatory in the 
relevant municipality. If the Offical Standard is found to be mandatory, 
then the proposed project will not satisfy additionality requirements and 
will be ineligible for CDM, since the project would have been presumed 
to have been implemented in the baseline scenario in compliance to the 
standard.
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additionality set out in a project’s PDD. 
If not appropriately structured and implemented, 
a Host County’s domestic laws may negatively 
impact upon its ability to implement CDM 
projects by making it more difficult to prove 
that such projects are additional.  Specifically, 
domestic laws that require the implementation 
of particular projects or activities, such as the 
installation of energy efficient technologies or 
other GHG reduction facilities, may effectively 
preclude the eligibility of such projects for CDM.  
If such projects are obligatory under domestic 
law, then the GHG reductions that they would 
achieve cannot be considered additional to those 
that would have been achieved without the 
registration and implementation of the project as 
a CDM activity.  
Avoiding Perverse Incentives: Type 
E- Domestic Policies and Measures
If the introduction of laws to reduce GHG 
emissions would prevent the implementation 
of CDM projects in a Host Country, by making 
it difficult for proposed CDM projects to satisfy 
the additionality requirement, then additionality 
arguably has the potential to generate the 
following perverse incentives for Host Countries: 
(a) to dissuade Host Countries from enacting 
laws or policies to support the CDM or 
otherwise require reductions in GHG 
emissions, based on concerns that such laws 
may prevent the satisfaction of additionality; 
or 
(b). to encourage Host Countries to enact 
laws or policies mandating activities that 
increase GHG emission reductions, such that 
additionality becomes easier to demonstrate.
Exclusion of such policies and regulations when 
determining additionality means that:
International Rule: Additionality
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol requires 
that each CDM project registered by the 
CDM Executive Board must result in “[r]
eductions in emissions that are additional 
to any that would occur in the absence of 
the certified project activity”.  
Under the CDM Rules, additionality 
amounts to a requirement that the GHG 
emissions of a CDM project are additional 
to (i.e, below) those that would have 
occurred in a scenario accepted to be the 
plausible alternative to the implementation 
of the CDM project. 
This alternative scenario may be the 
business-as-usual case (that is, the 
continuation of current emission levels in 
the absence of the CDM project), or it may 
be some other scenario involving a gradual 
lowering of emissions intensity. These 
scenarios must be clearly demonstrated in 
the Project Design Document (PDD).
Additionality is a principal condition for 
the eligibility of a project under the CDM 
and a pre-requisite to the validation 
and registration of a project as a CDM 
activity.  The requirement aims to protect 
the environmental integrity of the CDM, 
ensuring that all CERs represent genuine 
GHG reductions and that the system does 
not create perverse incentives for GHG 
“leakage”.   
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International Rule: classifying domestic policies and measures to 
avoid perverse incentives under additionality 
The CDM Executive Board, recognising these potential perverse 
incentives under the CDM Rules, adopted at its 16th meeting 
“clarifications on the treatment of national and/or sectoral policies and 
regulations in determining a baseline scenario.”  These clarifications 
defined four different types of national or sectoral policies, for use when 
determining the laws and policies applicable to CDM projects and the 
determination of additionality:
Type E+: existing national and/or sectoral policies or regulations that 
create policy-driven market distortions which give comparative 
advantages to more emissions-intensive technologies or fuels 
over less emissions-intensive technologies or fuels.
Type E-: national and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give 
positive comparative advantages to less emissions-intensive 
technologies over more emissions-intensive technologies (e.g. 
public subsidies to promote the diffusion of renewable energy 
or to finance energy efficiency programs).
Type L-: sectoral mandatory regulations adopted by a local or national 
public authority motivated by the reduction of negative local 
environmental externalities and/or energy conservation and 
which would incidentally also reduce GHG emissions.
Type L+: sectoral mandatory regulations adopted by a local or national 
public authority motivated by the reduction of negative local 
environmental externalities and which incidentally prevent the 
adoption/diffusion of less GHG emitting technology.
In order to avoid any perverse incentive as a result of the CDM’s 
additionality requirement, the CDM Executive Board has ruled that 
the following types of domestic regulations and policies should not 
be considered when determining whether a proposed CDM project is 
additional: 
Type E+ policies or regulations introduced after 11 December 1997 (1)
(the date the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the COP); and 
Type E- policies or regulations introduced after 11 November 2001 (2)
(the date of the COP decision that provided the foundation for the CDM 
Modalities). 
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Case Study: Renewable energy policies as Type E- policies in India
Renewable energy in India falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy and also under that of the State Government electricity regulatory 
authorities.  
India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy has implemented a suite of policies 
designed to encourage renewable energy projects, including tax concessions, a 
consolidated rate of customs duty, and a waiver of the requirement to obtain clearance 
from India’s Central Electricity Authority for investments of up to 1 billion rupees.  The 
Ministry has issued guidelines that require India’s state electricity boards to offer grid 
feed-in tariffs to solar and wind power producers, and important additional financial 
incentives are available for biomass/cogeneration and wind power projects. For example, 
wind power projects can benefit from accelerated capital depreciation. 
India’s National Electricity Policy promotes private sector participation in renewable 
energy, targets the reduction in capital costs of renewable energy technology through 
competition, provides for preferential tariffs, and promotes the benefits of cogeneration.  
The National Tariff Policy sets out provisions for minimum percentages of electricity to be 
purchased from renewable energy sources.
These measures increase the cost-competitiveness of renewable energy projects in India, 
without mandating their development per se.  As a result, these measures would not 
preclude Indian renewable energy projects from being registered as CDM projects on the 
basis of additionality.  
(a) Host Country policies introduced after the 
Kyoto Protocol that favor more emissions-
intensive technologies or fuels cannot be 
used as a basis for arguing that a proposed 
CDM project is additional, just because 
the project utilizes less emissions-intensive 
technologies or fuels.
(b) Host Countries policies that are introduced 
to support the CDM or other projects that 
reduce GHG emissions will not affect the 
ability of CDM project developers in those 
countries to demonstrate that proposed 
CDM projects are additional, in accordance 
with the Kyoto Protocol.
In light of the above, it is clearly important to 
understand the impacts that domestic laws 
and policies addressing the CDM and other 
issues related to GHG reductions may have 
on additionality.  Crafted and implemented 
appropriately, such laws and policies should 
not impede the satisfaction of additionality, or 
the broader implementation of CDM projects 
within Host Countries.  Most importantly, 
if a Host Country seeks to facilitate CDM 
implementation as part of its broader domestic 
policy strategy, then it should not impose 
any legal requirement that a particular type 
of project be implemented to fulfill a given 
domestic legal requirement.  For example, a 
domestic law requiring waste management 
companies to install landfill gas flaring facilities 
at landfills would preclude such companies 
from undertaking landfill gas flaring projects as 
CDM projects. 
36
International Rule: Programmatic CDM
The CDM Rules do not allow a local, regional or national policy or 
standard to be registered as a conventional CDM project.  However, the 
actual project activities implemented under such standards or policies are 
able to be grouped together and registered as a single “Programmatic” 
CDM project, defined by reference to the standard or policy being 
implemented (see 7/CMP.1, paragraph 20). 
The standard or policy that forms the basis for a Programmatic CDM 
project is called a “Programme of Activities” (PoA), and the individual 
activities that make up a Programmatic CDM project are called CDM 
Programme Activities (CPAs). 
The CDM Rules define a PoA as:
 A voluntary coordinated action by a private or public entity which 
coordinates and implements any policy/measure or stated goal 
(i.e. incentive schemes and voluntary programmes), which leads to 
anthropogenic GHG emission reductions or net anthropogenic GHG 
removals by sinks that are additional to any that would occur in the 
absence of the PoA, via an unlimited number of CPAs (EB 32, Annex 
38, paragraph 1).
Thus, a PoA can include any number of CPAs, and additional CPAs can be 
added to a PoA at any point during the operation of the PoA, including 
after registration (which distinguishes PoAs from bundled CDM projects 
that cannot have additional activities added to them after registration). 
The CDM Rules define a CPA as:
 A single, or a set of interrelated measure(s), to reduce GHG emissions 
or result in net anthropogenic GHG removals by sinks, applied within 
a designated area defined in the baseline methodology (EB 32, Annex 
38, page 1).
Programmatic CDM projects are led by the government authority or 
private entity responsible for introducing and implementing the policy or 
standard.  This entity is known as the ‘coordinating or managing entity’.  
PoAs are able to be implemented across multiple Host Countries.  In 
such cases, each Host Country in which CPAs will be implemented must 
provide an LoA for the PoA.  
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Case Study: Programmatic CDM project in Uganda
Programmatic CDM potentially provides opportunities for governments to 
adopt new roles in relation to CDM projects.  Government agencies are in 
a position to coordinate projects in-country and to effectively act as project 
entities.  For example, although the World Bank is the main coordinating/
managing entity for the project, the Ugandan National Environmental 
Management Authority (NEMA) is supporting the development of a municipal 
waste composting programme as a CDM PoA, under which it will be the Host 
Country entity named in the LoA.  The program will recover and compost 
organic waste, thereby avoiding methane emissions that would otherwise 
result from the decay of such waste, and reducing leachate contamination of 
water resources. This pioneering  
Programmatic CDM project, currently under validation, utilizes an 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan to 
finance activities in several Ugandan cities and towns, who shall act as CPAs 
under this PoA.  
Each individual participating municipality would constitute a single CPA, 
and shall provide land for the CPA and install and operate the necessary 
technology.  Each will sign a cooperation agreement with NEMA under which 
it transfers to NEMA all rights with respect to the GHG reductions achieved 
by the CPA.  NEMA will then manage data in relation to the GHG reductions 
achieved under each individual CPA, and communicate this information to 
the IBRD, as the coordinating/managing entity for the PoA.  The reductions 
achieved by each CPA will be verified separately from other CPAs. 
If, however, a domestic law or policy does not 
impose any obligation to implement a particular 
type of project, but rather provides incentives 
to encourage the implementation of such 
projects through fiscal or other financial means, 
and was introduced after 11 November 2001, 
then it should not prevent the implementation 
of such projects as CDM projects.
Examples of different types of domestic 
laws and policies that Host Countries could 
introduce to support GHG reduction activities 
without compromising their eligibility as a CDM 
activity include:
feed-in tariffs guaranteeing the purchase •	
of electricity generated from renewable 
energy at a particular price;
certificate schemes that enable projects •	
that reduce national GHG emissions to 
generate and sell certificates to entities 
such as polluters who are made liable 
under domestic law to acquire and 
surrender particular volumes of the 
certificates; 
“green” or “renewable energy” certificate •	
schemes that would operate in a similar 
manner as above, but with credits 
generated on the basis of electric power 
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produced by particular types of cleaner 
energy resources.
tax rebates, accelerated depreciation and •	
other fiscal concessions that reduce the 
tax liability of projects that reduce GHG 
emissions; and
simplified and/or expedited project •	
approval processes that make it quicker, 
easier and cheaper to obtain the necessary 
regulatory authorizations.   
 
It is important to note that under the 
International CDM Rules, even where there is 
a mandatory law or policy requiring emission 
reductions in a particular sector, such laws 
or policies can be legitimately disregarded in 
setting the business as usual baseline for the 
CDM project where proper analysis shows 
that there is widespread non-compliance in a 
country or region with such mandatory laws 
and policies.
Domestic Programmes and Policy as CDM 
Projects: Programmatic CDM 
The CDM Rules allow multiple GHG reduction 
activities (CPAs) implemented pursuant to a 
policy or program (PoA) to be registered as a 
single Programmatic CDM project.  In this way, 
Programmatic CDM creates the potential for 
Non-Annex I Parties (or other coordinating or 
managing entities) to introduce policies and 
programmes that facilitate GHG reduction 
activities, and have these activities grouped 
together and registered as a CDM project 
capable of generating CERs.  Finance generated 
from the sale of CERs can then support the 
implementation of additional activities, helping 
to increase the effectiveness of the relevant 
policy or program.  Thus, Programmatic CDM 
can facilitate the successful implementation of 
national GHG reduction policies, by enabling 
the generation of additional revenue to fund 
policy implementation. 
By allowing the CPAs under a PoA to 
be conducted as a single CDM project, 
Programmatic CDM could help remove 
regulatory and transaction cost barriers that 
would otherwise restrict small-scale CDM 
activities particularly those implemented in 
poor communities or in Least Developed 
Countries.  Programmatic CDM is therefore 
able to generate dual financial benefits for 
national GHG reduction policies, by enabling 
both the generation of finance from CER sales, 
and reductions in the cost of implementation. 
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5 Domestic Law and the CDM:      
 Impacts and Barriers
resources, as well as fossil fuels and 
vegetation;
securities and financial products; •	
corruption and public sector transparency •	
in relation to investment generally; 
employment and labour; and•	
the use and trade of project outputs, •	
such as electricity, industrial products and 
waste.
 
 
Removing Domestic Legal 
Barriers to CDM Projects
As articulated in the introduction to this 
Guidebook, clear and robust domestic laws 
can potentially establish regulatory settings 
that strongly facilitate the implementation 
of CDM projects. At the same time, existing 
domestic laws may inadvertently create barriers 
to implementing such projects. Such barriers 
may well nullify the benefits of even those laws 
specifically designed to support CDM project 
implementation, and, in some cases, prevent 
their implementation altogether.
This paradox stems from both: 
the peculiarities of the CDM, for example, •	
the need for project developers to be able 
to distinguish, hold and sell the rights 
to GHG reductions generated by CDM 
projects; and
the nature of the underlying projects that •	
provide vehicles for CDM projects, for 
example, the need to understand the Host 
Country legal regime governing foreign 
investment, and to manage the risks 
associated with this regime in the context 
of projects requiring significant capital 
expenditure and protracted lifetimes. 
 
It is important, therefore, for CDM Host 
Countries to appreciate the significance of their 
Domestic Laws affecting CDM Projects
CDM projects, while being attributed 
particular characteristics and abilities under 
the CDM Rules (for example the ability to 
generate CERs), are nonetheless founded upon 
conventional underlying projects, outside the 
CDM context.  The implementation of a project 
as a CDM project represents only one aspect 
of the broader implementation of the project 
(albeit a financially determinative aspect, in 
accordance with additionality). 
CDM projects must therefore comply not 
only with the international CDM Rules and 
applicable Host Country CDM Laws, but also 
with all other applicable Host Country laws 
regulating projects more generally.  As a result, 
barriers to CDM projects under domestic laws 
may exist not only within the laws acted (or 
not enacted) specifically for the purposes of the 
CDM, but also within existing laws regulating 
the activities and sectors that lend themselves 
toward potential CDM projects.  Types and 
examples of domestic laws that affect CDM 
projects are discussed in more detail in chapters 
6, 7 and 8.  
A broad range of domestic laws can impact 
upon projects that may be implemented under 
the CDM.  Such laws include those governing:
the assessment and approval of such •	
projects, for example the various regulatory 
approvals required for industrial projects, 
energy projects and other infrastructure 
projects;
title to the land on which such projects •	
are developed, including customary or 
traditional title to land; 
investment in such projects, by both •	
national and foreign entities; 
resources to be exploited in implementing •	
such projects, such as renewable energy 
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existing domestic legal regimes with respect to 
CDM eligibility and risk profiles.  Options for 
the identification and removal of Host Country 
domestic legal barriers to CDM projects are 
outlined below.  
Identification of Barriers by 
Host Country DNAs
As discussed in section 4, above, Host Country 
DNAs may be mandated to proactively 
investigate and identify barriers to CDM 
projects within the relevant Host Country and, 
where possible, catalyze their removal. This is a 
long-term process that entails:
(a) identifying relevant existing domestic laws 
with the potential to materially impact Host 
Country CDM processes and/or underlying 
investment projects;
(b) assessing  the likelihood and magnitude of 
the impacts of those laws on underlying 
projects and Host Country CDM processes; 
and
(c) formulating solutions and 
recommendations for the removal of the 
identified domestic legal barriers. 
As entities responsible for assessing and 
approving proposed CDM projects in 
accordance with the CDM Rules, DNAs are 
well positioned to carry out the steps set 
out above.  This could include studying best 
practices in Host Countries that are perceived 
to be relatively free of domestic legal barriers 
to CDM investment and the ways in which 
they were able to achieve this.  It could also 
include studying the way international investors 
perceive such legal barriers. 
DNAs have an important role to play in 
facilitating or even spearheading targeted 
domestic legal reform processes. Any ultimate 
removal of identified legal barriers may, 
however, necessitate cooperation with the 
legislature or equivalent body, in order to 
enact, amend, or repeal particular laws, since 
actual legislative functions are not likely to 
be included within the mandates of DNAs).  
These processes could also be advanced within 
the context of broader capacity building and 
experience-sharing programs undertaken by 
multiple DNAs, in order to disseminate lessons 
and propagate good practice between Host 
Countries and across jurisdictions.
By combining domestic legal reform process 
with the enactment of dedicated new laws to 
promote the CDM, Host Countries can create 
an optimal regulatory environment for the 
implementation of CDM projects, by removing 
domestic legal barriers and establishing 
domestic legal supports, both of which are 
necessary for a Host Country to fully realize its 
CDM potential. 
Targeted Domestic Law Reform
The enactment of laws by a Host Country to 
promote CDM within its jurisdiction can extend 
beyond the enactment of new laws specifically 
dedicated to the CDM to also include the 
reform of existing laws. Even relatively minor 
reforms to existing laws can sometimes remove 
key legal barriers and constitute novel CDM 
promotion mechanisms. Some Host Country 
laws governing foreign investment specify 
priority sectors given priority treatment 
and special benefits or concessions that are 
accounted for by investors when assessing 
project risks and opportunities. Uganda’s 
Investment Code Act, which commenced on 
25 January 1991 makes such a provision.  
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Case Study: Mauritius and the Benefits of  
Regulatory Capacity Building 
As a small island developing state (SIDS) and CDM Host Country 
with relatively limited potential for mounting many large-scale 
projects, the Republic of Mauritius quickly recognized the need to 
establish a robust legal framework to promote foreign investment 
in GHG Reduction projects and an efficient CDM project approval 
process. Under the umbrella of the CD4CDM project, a two-year 
capacity building program implemented by the UNEP Risoe Center 
(URC) together with the Mauritian Ministry of Environment, a 
comprehensive Regulation governing the CDM was formulated in 
record time in comparison to other countries in the region. Over 
the course of three days, the DNA Secretariat, the Minister of 
Environment, and URC advisors convened all relevant government 
stakeholders including the State Law Office around the table to 
quickly thrash out the content of the regulation. Beyond the process 
itself, the final regulation adopted—the Environment Protection 
(Designated National Authority) Regulations of 2009—is one of 
the most compact yet comprehensive models yet to be adopted in 
Africa, with a streamlined approval procedure eliminatingduplication 
between the EIA processes and the public participation requirements 
associated with CDM approval. As such, the case study is an example 
of both good practice in DNA regulation development and the 
benefits of more structured CDM capacity building programs that 
include targeted legal reform and regulatory advisory services. 
42
The relatively recent advent of the CDM 
often results in the CDM being omitted as a 
specific priority sector or enterprise in such 
foreign investment laws, although identified 
priority sectors could include sectors relevant 
to the CDM.  Amending the list of priority 
sectors identified in foreign investment laws 
to specifically include CDM projects would 
remove potential legal barriers arising from 
uncertainty on the part of CDM investors as 
to whether their project would be eligible for 
unique benefits or given priority treatment.  
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6 Domestic Law and the CDM:       
 Property Law
Significantly, title to each asset may vest in 
a different entity, resulting in a complex set 
of property rights and interests in the assets 
comprising a single CDM project.  Domestic 
laws will also deal with the protection of 
property rights, including any limitations on the 
terms and conditions on which property may 
pass under contract, as well as expropriation or 
nationalization.  
Proprietary Rights to CERs 
Domestic property laws that clearly define 
and adequately protect the property rights 
of project participants will give project 
developers and investors confidence that a 
CDM project can be successfully implemented 
in a Host Country, and that the project outputs 
and returns on investment can be secured 
appropriately.  
In many CDM Host Countries domestic legal 
regimes do not yet encompass intangibles such 
as GHG reductions, much less CERs specifically.  
A further complication in such jurisdictions can 
be dealing with communal ownership of GHG 
reductions.  The evolution of such laws would 
need to consider issues of recognition of the 
property in such GHG reductions, how risk, 
property and title in such GHG reductions could 
be passed, and how this can be measured. 
Specifically, there are often gaps with respect 
to the treatment of, under domestic laws with 
respect to: 
(a) the status or general classification of GHG 
reductions and CERs (or other tradable 
carbon assets);
(b) the allocation of title to such assets once 
generated or issued; or
(c) the contractual transfer of title to such 
assets.   
Property Laws Relevant to CDM Projects
CDM projects comprise a range of different 
property assets, each of which may be governed 
either by general Host Country property law, 
or specific laws enacted to regulate the asset 
either independently or in the context of 
broader domestic regulation of the CDM.  The 
property assets likely to form part of a CDM 
project include the:
land on which the project is to be •	
developed; 
equipment, technologies and materials •	
required to construct and operate the 
project;
resources and other inputs involved in the •	
project (e.g. water, wind or landfill gas for 
electricity generation projects, industrial 
materials to be processed in industrial 
CDM projects, and fuel and electricity);
products, materials or other outputs •	
generated by the project, such as 
electricity, industrial or manufactured 
products or landfill; 
proprietary security interests in the assets •	
comprising the project, such as mortgages 
over land or equipment benefitting banks, 
financiers or other secured creditors; and
GHG reductions achieved by the project •	
(e.g., the CERs issued by the CDM 
Executive Board with respect to such 
reductions, and revenues from their sale.
 
Legal entitlement to each of these assets will 
generally be governed by the domestic law of 
the Host Country, and typically addressed in 
commercial contracts between the asset owner 
and other stakeholders.  Such contracts may, in 
turn, be governed by another jurisdiction, for 
example contracts for the sale and purchase of 
CERs are often governed by English law. 
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In accordance with accepted international legal 
practice, the CDM Rules confine themselves 
to issues of international law and procedure, 
and do not address domestic issues related to 
property assets and rights associated with CDM 
projects and CERs. 
As a result, where a Host Country’s domestic 
legal framework establishing and protecting 
property rights does not address title issues 
around CDM projects, then the regulatory 
treatment of these rights in the Host Country 
will remain uncertain.  While the market 
has dealt with these uncertainties to date 
(primarily by representations and warranties 
under commercial contract), this uncertainty 
does have the potential to become a source of 
risk that discourages stakeholders, including 
prospective investors, from participating in 
CDM projects in the Host Country, such that 
the Host Country is less able to realize its CDM 
potential. 
Proprietary Rights to CERs under 
the International CDM Rules and 
under Host Country Domestic Law
CERs are internationally tradable units 
generated and issued in accordance with 
international law.  Under the CDM Rules, each 
CER represents a reduction in GHGs in the 
atmosphere equal to one ton of carbon dioxide 
(therefore known as one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent, or CO2-e).  As a result, Annex I 
Parties can use CERs, and the GHG reductions 
that underpin them, to comply with their GHG 
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
CERs are issued by the CDM Executive Board, 
A unique electronic serial number is ascribed to 
each and every CER  that may then be used to 
identify:
its status or type of tradable Kyoto (a) 
Protocol unit, i.e. whether it is a CER, an 
Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) from a Joint 
Implementation project, or another unit, for 
example an Assigned Amount Unit (AAU);
the Kyoto Protocol Commitment Period for (b) 
which the CER was issued (the first Period 
extends from 2008 to 2012, inclusive); 
the Host Country of the project from which (c) 
the CER was issued; and 
the CDM project activity itself. (d) 
Although the CDM Rules provide for this 
means of distinguishing individual CERs from 
each other, they do not explicitly deal with 
the issue of legal entitlement to CERs, nor the 
GHG reductions that underpin them. Under 
international law there is a presumption that 
the Host Country, as a sovereign nation that 
has agreed under international law to be bound 
by the Kyoto Protocol, has a sovereign right to 
the GHG reductions achieved by CDM projects 
hosted within its jurisdiction as well as the CERs 
issued with respect to those reductions.  These 
rights may then, in turn, be transferred by the 
Host Country to their authorized CDM project 
participants through the issuance of an LoA. This 
procedure is discussed below. 
Where Host Country law does not specifically 
address the issue of title to CERs, and there are 
no other laws, legal principles or precedents 
to the contrary, then the international legal 
presumptions outlined above will apply. The 
courts of the Host Country, in other words, 
would likely accept the principle that, in the 
DNA’s act of Issuing an LoA which authorizes a 
Host Country entity to develop and implement 
a CDM project within its jurisdiction, the Host 
Country government is implicitly transferring 
its sovereign rights to the GHG Reductions and 
associated CERs to that entity named in the LoA 
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(unless the LoA or other relevant Host Country 
law states otherwise) and uphold the rights 
conferred on them.
It should be noted, however, that despite 
this presumption, prospective project 
developers may nonetheless remain uncertain 
of whether they will be able to secure title 
to the CERs generated by a CDM project.  
This is particularly so where the nature of 
the project makes it unclear which party or 
parties should initially be vested with legal 
title to the CERs. For example, in a run-of-river 
hydropower CDM project in which the state 
owned the water resource constituted by the 
river, local communities were recognized to 
have customary title to local water resources. 
A CDM project developer had simultaneously 
been granted the planning approvals required 
to develop the hydropower plant. Each party 
could thus reasonably seek to claim an interest 
in the CERs generated by the project, given 
their respective contributions. 
In another example, a geothermal CDM project 
might be developed under a regulatory regime 
in which a State-owned oil and gas company is 
the sole entity authorized to exploit geothermal 
resources, but also having the authority to 
enter into joint operation contracts with others, 
under which those private parties would be 
appointed to the company to develop and 
operate projects.  In this situation, despite the 
private sector party’s provision of funding and/
or involvement in the physical development 
and operation of the project , it is not entirely 
clear under the Host Country domestic laws 
who would have the prima facie legal rights 
to the emission reductions and resulting 
CERs, since the regulatory framework in 
place recognizes the State-owned oil and 
gas company as the exclusive owner of the 
geothermal resource, with the private party 
only acting as a “contractor”.  
Transparent and definitive clarification of which 
party(ies) will have title to CERs by Host Country 
regulators in accordance with domestic law 
can substantially resolve uncertainties that may 
otherwise preclude CDM projects from being 
implemented in the Host Country.  CDM Host 
Countries could therefore reduce domestic CDM 
risks and attract CDM investments by explicitly 
addressing in LoAs the issue of transfer of legal 
title to CERs, as for example,  is done in South 
African LoAs.  LoAs issued by the South African 
DNA clarify that the country itself owns all GHG 
reductions generated by South African CDM 
projects, and on this basis, it authorizes the 
project participant named in the LoA:
to become the private owner of rights, title (a) 
and interest in and to the GHG reductions 
achieved by the project; and
to sell such rights, title and interests.(b)  
Other Domestic Property Law Issues 
Just as the CDM Rules do not seek to regulate 
the issue of title to CERs—such that in the 
absence of domestic laws to the contrary there 
is a presumption that they vest initially with 
the entity named in the LoA— the CDM Rules 
also fall silent on some of the more subtle 
and potentially contentious issues relevant to 
property rights associated with CDM projects. 
Some examples of those that may potentially 
arise in the course of implementing, and 
transacting CERs from, a CDM project include:
rights and title to revenues from the sale of (a) 
CERs, including where there are multiple 
entities, including Annex I or other foreign 
entities, involved in the development and 
operation of a CDM project;
rights, conditions or restrictions with respect (b) 
to the land on which CDM projects are built 
and operated, including where CDM projects 
46
are built and operated by Annex I or other 
foreign entities;
the extent to which individual project (c) 
participants and other parties can use 
contracts to allocate title to CERs and other 
project assets; and
whether, and under what conditions, some (d) 
or all CERs or other CDM project assets may 
be expropriated.
Quite often, these issues are either not well 
anticipated by project participants or it is 
initially unclear how they may affect their 
interests.  Where these and other similar issues 
are specifically addressed and resolved under 
Host Country domestic law, CDM project 
participants will enjoy much greater certainty as 
to their rights to project assets including CERs, 
and will be better able to protect their rights 
and interests using contracts and other legal 
and commercial tools and strategies, rather than 
resorting to litigation. 
The approaches taken by different Host 
Countries to regulating the above issues, and 
the risks and benefits these approaches create, 
are discussed in more detail below. 
Rights to Revenue from the Sale of CERs
Although title to CERs generated by a CDM 
project may vest in the entity named in the 
Host Country LoA, whether explicitly under 
Host Country domestic law or by implicit 
presumption under principles of international 
law, the entity so named may not enjoy 
proprietary rights and title with respect to all of 
the revenue generated from the sale of CERs.  
Many Host Countries have introduced domestic 
laws that allocate title to part of the revenue 
from CER sales to the Host Country, in the form 
of a Host Country tax or levy.
Host Country Land Rights
Security of land title and related property 
rights are vital for the successful hosting and 
implementation of CDM projects.  Where 
uncertainty prevails as to the security of 
title to the land on which a CDM project is 
to be developed, or to the resources acting 
as inputs to or products from the project, 
then the project risk profile will be increased 
substantially. In such cases, it will be much 
more difficult to obtain finance for the project. 
The following are key property rights 
issues relevant to CDM projects and their 
implementation within Host Countries:
How has title to the land on which the •	
CDM project is to be developed been 
secured? Does the project developer own 
the land, does it have a long-term lease 
over the land, or is the land sub-leased 
from another lessor? 
If the project developer does not own the •	
land, do the property rights held by other 
parties, (e.g. the lessee), confer any rights 
on such parties with respect to the CDM 
project or, more particularly, the CERs 
generated by it? 
Are there any conditions or restrictions •	
on foreign parties owning land or holding 
other land rights within the Host Country? 
Are rights to GHG reductions and/or CERs •	
generated by a CDM project located on 
a parcel of land, for example, through 
a forestry CDM project, included in the 
rights held by the owner of the land? 
Do any parties hold customary or •	
traditional land rights in respect of the 
land, and how are these rights to be 
protected in the course of developing the 
CDM project, whether through conferring 
rights to CERs or otherwise?  
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Securing Title to the Land 
for the CDM Project 
The means by which a project developer has 
secured title to the land on which a CDM 
project is to be developed is one of the key 
issues that prospective investors and financiers 
will investigate when conducting due diligence 
assessments. 
Clearly, where a project developer owns the 
land on which the CDM project will be located, 
then security of land title will generally be 
easy to demonstrate, and such title will not be 
a source of concern or risk for investors.  For 
example, if a waste management company 
owns and operates landfills on land owned by 
the company, then there is unlikely to be any 
question as to ownership of the required land, 
should the company choose to implement a 
CDM project at the landfill site.
The issue of security of land title will not be so 
easily dealt with where:
(a) the project developer does not own the 
land on which the project is to be located; 
or
(b) land rights are not adequately protected 
under Host Country domestic law to allow 
confidence and certainty as to security of 
title—even where the project developer 
does own the relevant land. 
In some Host Countries, the state alone owns 
all lands, such that private parties may only 
Case Study: Revenue from the sale of CERs from Vietnamese CDM 
projects
Decision No. 130/2007/QD-TTg issued by the Vietnamese Prime Minister 
on 2 August 2007 requires parties allocating, receiving or selling CERs from 
Vietnamese projects to register this allocation, receipt or sale with the 
Vietnam Environmental Protection Fund, and pay a fee with respect to any 
CER sale.  The fee is calculated by reference to the volume of CERs sold 
and to pay the CER market price at the time of sale, multiplied by a sector-
specific fee rate specified in Inter-Ministerial Circular No. 58/2008TTLT-BTC-
BTN&MT.  
This levy effectively entitles the Vietnamese Government to take a share 
of CER revenues.  In this way, domestic Vietnamese law directly regulates 
property rights with respect to revenue from the sale of CERs issued with 
respect to Vietnamese CDM projects, by limiting the rights of CER sellers and 
conferring a right on the Government to be paid the applicable fee.  
By specifying different fee rates for different CDM project sectors, the 
Vietnamese Government is also able to promote the implementation of 
particular types of CDM projects.  The fee regime creates an incentive to 
implement CDM projects in those sectors subject to a lesser fee rate, while 
those sectors subject to higher fees are likely to be less attractive to project 
developers.   
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lease land from the state in order to obtain 
the necessary land rights.  Similar issues of 
competing title and risks of challenge arise in 
this context, and may increase the risk and 
difficulty of implementing a CDM project 
in the same way as discussed above.  If the 
Host Country legal system affords adequate 
protection for the land rights of parties leasing 
land from the state, however, then such 
arrangements may be more secure and less risky 
than owning land in a jurisdiction where land 
rights are relatively poorly protected. 
Property Rights of Other Parties, 
and Impacts on CER Title
If a CDM project developer does not own 
the land on which the CDM project is to be 
developed, then the landowner, as a separate 
party with its own set of interests and concerns, 
will nonetheless become an important 
stakeholder in the CDM project.  The project 
developer will need to be able to demonstrate 
to investors that the landowner has granted it 
all rights and approvals necessary to develop 
the CDM project, or that it is otherwise 
within its rights to proceed with the project as 
contemplated. 
An additional, equally important issue is 
whether Host Country domestic property law:
automatically confers on the landowner any (a) 
rights with respect to the CDM project or 
CERs generated by it; or
provides any means through which the (b) 
landowner can take action to secure such 
rights. 
Similar issues arise where a party other than the 
project developer owns the physical assets that 
comprise the CDM project, such as machinery 
and equipment. 
Where Host Country domestic property 
law confers, or has the potential to confer, 
competing rights to CERs to a property owner 
other than the project developer, the project 
developer may be unable to secure full and 
indefeasible proprietary rights with respect 
to all CERs generated.  This will potentially 
make it more difficult to sell the CERs from 
the project, as the rights of each party will 
need to be reflected in the sale arrangements, 
and purchasers generally prefer to buy from a 
unique seller who can warrant that it has full 
legal and beneficial title to all the CERs that 
have been, or will be, generated.  
Given that the sale of CERs is itself a key source 
of revenue and finance for CDM projects, and 
also often a means of obtaining additional debt 
or equity finance for a project, obstacles to 
the sale of CERs may become obstacles to the 
broader financing and viability of the project. 
Restrictions on Foreign 
Ownership of Property
Countries often impose certain restrictions on 
foreign ownership of land and other property 
within its territory.  For example, the domestic 
property law of a CDM Host Country may state 
that:
foreign entities are only allowed to own (a) 
land within specific areas or zones, or 
where they have obtained particular 
licenses such as foreign investment 
licenses;
foreign entities are not allowed to own (b) 
land within the Host Country under any 
circumstances; and/or
foreign entities are not allowed to own (c) 
certain types of assets within the Host 
Country, such as major infrastructure 
assets, or can do so only under limited 
circumstances. 
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Where such restrictions apply, CDM projects 
will need to be structured in a manner that 
complies with the applicable restrictions, in 
order to obtain the necessary approvals and 
consents.  For example, if foreign ownership of 
Host Country land or assets is prohibited, then 
the land and project assets would need to be 
owned by a suitable Host Country entity (see 
discussion below).   
Where Host Country laws prohibit foreign 
ownership of land, and thus a foreign entity 
seeking to develop a CDM project is unable 
to purchase the land on which it wishes to 
develop a CDM project, a Host Country entity 
must  act as an owner, or at least majority 
owner, of the necessary land.  In this situation, 
ownership of the CDM project could be 
structured in the following ways:
A special purpose company could be •	
incorporated under the law of the Host 
Country, in which the Host Country 
entity owns 51% (i.e. a majority) of the 
issued share capital, and the foreign 
project developer owns 49%.  The special 
purpose company would then own the 
land on which the CDM project was to 
be developed; domestic property laws 
would be complied with and the foreign 
project developer would have a degree of 
ownership and control over the land.  
The Host Country entity and foreign •	
project developer could form an equity 
joint venture (JV), with the Host Country 
holding 51% and the foreign project 
developer 49% of the equity in the JV.  
The JV could thus act in the same way as 
a special purpose company in the example 
above, for the purpose of land ownership. 
Note that each of these alternatives •	
assumes that Host Country domestic 
property law will characterize an entity 
that is majority owned and controlled by 
a Host Country national entity.  Although 
typically the case, this would need to be 
confirmed in each instance. 
A Host Country entity could take full •	
(100%) ownership of the land and then 
enter into a lease with the foreign project 
developer, enabling the developer to use 
the land for the purposes of implementing 
the CDM project.  This approach would, 
however, require the foreign project 
developer being permitted under Host 
Country law to enter into such a lease, and 
depend on the ability of the Host Country 
legal system to protect the developer’s 
property rights as lessor. 
Restrictions on Foreign 
Ownership of CDM Projects
A key issue in the design and development 
of a CDM project is whether the project will 
be wholly owned by a Host Country entity, or 
whether a foreign participant, i.e., an Annex 
I entity, may seek to own part or all of the 
project.  Foreign ownership of CDM projects 
is often strictly regulated in Host Country 
domestic law, either in the form of specific 
legislation addressing foreign ownership of 
CDM projects, or under general law governing 
foreign ownership of domestic assets. 
As with restrictions on ownership of land and 
other real property, Host Country laws may 
provide (whether specifically or generally) that 
CDM projects must be at least majority (if not 
wholly) owned by a Host Country party, and 
cannot be subject to the majority ownership or 
control of a foreign party.  China, for example, 
has enacted a specific CDM Supplementary 
Law as discussed in section 4.7 stipulating 
that Chinese CDM projects must be either 
wholly Chinese-owned, or subject to a Chinese 
controlling interest (that is to say majority 
Chinese-owned).  The domestic property laws 
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Case Study: Land ownership and CDM projects in Thailand
Thai domestic property law does not allow foreign parties to own land in Thailand. 
In practice, however, there are means through which foreign entities may acquire 
proprietary rights, and even own land, as follows:
Thai law permits foreign parties to lease immovable property for commercial (a) 
or industrial purposes. As a result, foreign CDM project developers may 
lease the land required to develop the contemplated CDM project, in lieu of 
actually owning it.  Commercial leases can continue for up to 50 years under 
Thai law, meaning that the period of the lease should allow sufficient time to 
accommodate the full development and implementation of the CDM project, 
such that the project can complete its crediting period and generate the 
required returns for investors. Leasing rather than owning the land on which 
CDM projects are located does, however, create additional risks for project 
developers and investors, as discussed above.
Thai law permits Thai companies partly-owned by non-Thai shareholders to (b) 
own land, provided that:
(i) not more than 49% of the shares in the company are owned by foreign 
parties; and
(ii) a numerical majority of the shareholders are Thai persons or companies.
Thus, a foreign CDM project developer could form a special purpose Thai company in 
order to purchase the land on which a CDM project would be located.  The foreign 
project developer’s ownership and control of the land would, however, be limited to a 
minority stake.
It should be noted that significant penalties apply to Thai parties found to have 
acquired Thai land as an agent for a foreign person or company.  These penalties 
include a fine of up to Baht 20,000, imprisonment for up to two years, or both.
Foreign parties are permitted under Thai law to enter into joint ventures with Thai 
parties.  Where Thai co-venturers hold 51% or more of the registered shares in the 
joint venture, it will be characterized as a Thai entity for the purposes of Thai law, 
and able to own land in Thailand.  A JV could therefore be used in the same way as a 
special purpose Thai company in order to acquire land for a CDM project, as discussed 
above.
The Thai Board of Investment offers a number of incentives and concessions to 
approved foreign parties investing in activities sought to be promoted within Thailand, 
including the ability for approved investors to own land in Thailand.  In addition, a 
number of CDM project types, including renewable energy and waste sector projects, 
may be eligible for support under Thai investment promotion schemes.
As a result, where a foreign project developer wishes to develop a CDM project eligible 
for investment support from the Thai Board of Investment, then provided the project is 
approved, the foreign developer will be eligible to apply for a concession allowing it to 
own the land on which the CDM project is to be located.
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of many other Host Countries establish similar 
restrictions under their general regulatory 
framework that apply equally to CDM projects 
and assets. 
Where such laws apply, it may nonetheless 
be possible for an Annex I entity to part-own 
a CDM project (although holding less than 
a majority share in the project).  An Annex I 
entity could, for example, enter into an equity 
JV with a Host Country entity, in which the 
Host Country entity held at least 51% of the 
equity in the venture, and the Annex I entity 
49% or less.  The CDM project would then 
be owned by the JV, and the CERs generated 
by the project would be shared by the Host 
Country and Annex I JV partners in accordance 
with their equity shares.  This is illustrated 
below. 
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Case Study: Land ownership and CDM forestry projects in Mali
In countries such as the Republic of Mali, which have large potential for forestry CDM 
projects but are also undergoing land tenure reform, the process of determining final title 
to the CERs arising from such projects can be particularly complex, for several reasons. 
Malian forestry and land laws consist of multiple layers. Malian domestic law recognizes 
customary land rights, as well as customary rights concerning wood exploitation and 
other entitlements related to forests, in parallel to domestic legislation. 
Furthermore, current legislation is under review and a decentralization process is taking 
place that could strongly affect the way that forestry and natural resources are managed. 
Mali’s decentralization legislation* establishes “territorial collectivities” (CTs), categorized 
into regions, circles and communities, vested with legal personality and crucial 
competences in the area of forest resource management. Although transfer of national 
resources as well as financial resources is foreseen, the process is yet to be effected; 
meanwhile CTs are entitled to develop local natural resources management plans prior to 
such transfer, which is now common practice. 
The Government of Mali has established and actively encourages use of a new legal 
instrument called “conventions locales” for natural resource management.  Such 
legal instruments regulate natural resource use among villages, between villages and 
communes, or among whole communes, which has as its aim the creation, modification 
or extension of rights. Thus, certain CDM forestry projects may need to be formalized 
in the form of a convention locale. As a concrete example, a CDM project at the village 
level would not only require the agreement of the village chief, but also an agreement 
between the village and the larger commune, which will likely verify that the project 
is in line with the communal ‘Social, Cultural and Economic Development Program’. The 
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commune would ask to be consulted in the planning phase and may negotiate to share a 
percentage of the eventual revenues.  Depending on the scope of the project, communes 
might also need to consult with federal ministries and other state entities such as the 
Nature Conservation Service.  
Under the land law of Mali, all non-matriculated land areas are state owned. Within 
this category, customary land and usage rights are explicitly recognized and exercised 
individually or collectively**. The same legislation confers rights to customary or village 
chiefs, although these are limited to exploitation rights. This means that only exploitation 
rights can be conferred to third parties. 
Usage rights as currently defined in forestry laws extend to physical persons and local 
collectivities to enable them to satisfy their basic needs, excluding all uses that could 
lead to a commercial transaction. All commercial exploitation of forest resources goes 
beyond traditional usage rights and would therefore be subject to taxation (Decret 
01-204 ). A strict interpretation of the law would imply considering the generation of 
carbon credits as a commercial transaction and as such, outside the scope of land use 
rights. Furthermore, an exploitation permit, issued by the CTs, would likely be required 
for carbon credits to be extracted from afforestation or reforestation activities, as they 
are required for any other type of forest exploitation. 
* Loi N. 96-050 portant principes de constitution net de gestion du domaine des Collectivités 
Territoriales and Loi 95-034/AN-RM of 12 April 1995 on Collectivités Territoriales en Republique de 
Mali, amended by Loi, n.98-010 of 15 June 1998, amended by loi 98-066 of 30 December 1998.
** Ordonnance 00-027 of 22 Mars 2000 portant code domanial et foncier
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Proprietary Rights to GHG Reductions 
and Removals from Forestry Projects 
Section 6 discusses in detail the issue of which 
party or parties may have proprietary rights to 
CERs issued with respect to a CDM project.  
Whether Host Country property law provides 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) any means 
by which a party may take proprietary rights 
with respect to the GHG reductions achieved 
on a particular parcel of land or by a particular 
project—separate and distinct from other 
proprietary rights attached to such land or 
project—is a separate consideration, however. 
This issue is of particular significance to forestry 
CDM projects.  
Just as the trees located on a parcel of land may 
be characterized as a resource that forms part 
of the land, so the GHG reductions achieved 
through the sequestration of carbon dioxide in 
those trees achieved by a forestry CDM project 
could be construed as the property of the 
landowner. 
If this is the case, then the CERs issued with 
respect to such GHG reductions should arguably 
also be the property of the landowner, as they 
correspond directly to the GHG reductions or 
removals achieved by a CDM project.  
A presumption that title to CERs from forestry 
projects should accrue to the landowner 
conflicts with the presumption that title accrues 
to the entity named in the Host Country LoA (at 
least to the extent that the landowner is not the 
party named in the LoA).  It may also conflict 
with any explicit law or regulation enacted by 
the Host Country to allocate original title to 
CERs to a party other than the landowner.   In 
addition, carbon buyers generally require that 
CER sellers also transfer to the purchaser all 
rights with respect to the GHG reductions 
underlying those CERs.
In light of the above, Host Country 
domestic property law will be better able 
to accommodate forestry CDM projects if it 
provides a means by which title to the GHG 
reductions from carbon sequestration in trees 
can be separated from title to the land on 
which the trees are located. 
In Australia, for example, several state (i.e. 
provincial-level) legislatures have introduced 
laws enabling parties to take title specifically 
to the GHG reductions achieved by forest 
sinks, and formally register this title with the 
Government.  Registration secures the rights 
against third party challenge, and enables them 
to be transferred in the same way as other 
proprietary rights with respect to land, such as 
easements and profits à prendre.  In this way, 
the proprietary rights with respect to GHG 
reductions from forest sinks can be separated 
and sold separately from both the forest itself, 
and the land on which the forest is located. 
Customary Land Title
Many CDM Host Countries recognize 
traditional or customary land title in addition 
to domestic property laws enacted by statute, 
code or other legal device.  Customary title 
to land in Host Countries is often defined by 
rules and practices observed by traditional 
landholders that serve to protect interests 
arising prior to the advent of more formal 
statutory or other property law regimes.  
Rights and interests in land arising under the 
statutory or other regime are generally subject 
to the rights and interests of customary land 
title holders, which by nature vary between 
countries, regions and communities.  
Recognition and protection of customary land 
rights is fundamental to the legal and social 
systems of the Host Countries in which they 
arise, and the ability of domestic property 
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laws to define and uphold such rights are vital 
components of Host Country legal systems. 
Customary land title can, however, create 
additional complications and risks for the 
development of CDM projects in Host 
Countries that recognize such rights.  These 
include:
Local and regional variations in customary •	
land title laws and in the requirements for 
acquiring the land rights may necessitate 
additional time and expenditure in 
determining how best to secure the 
necessary title to a particular parcel of 
land.
Ascertaining the customary land title laws •	
applicable to a specific parcel of land, 
and how those laws interact with other 
Host Country domestic property laws, 
may be particularly difficult where such 
customary laws are not formally recorded, 
or information with respect to such laws is 
not readily available. 
Where tribal leaders are seen to have •	
ownership or other interests in such lands, 
the risk that such leaders may demand 
payment or a share of CERs generated by 
a CDM project in return for the use of the 
land upon which it is situated.
An increased need to engage directly with •	
local landholders in order to determine 
Case Study: Guarantees against expropriation in Mexico
Mexico has enshrined protections against expropriation in its Constitution 
or broader domestic law.
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution provides that the state may only 
expropriate private property for a “public purpose”, and in doing so must 
offer “fair compensation”.  
Mexico’s Law of Expropriation lists the circumstances and public purposes 
that would justify expropriation of private property.  Significantly, 
raising revenue is explicitly rejected as grounds for expropriation.  The 
law also requires that private parties whose property is to be subject to 
state expropriation must be give a minimum of 15 days' notice of the 
expropriation, and provides an automatic right of administrative appeal 
against an expropriation order.  Once effected, the fair market value of the 
property must be paid to the party subject to the expropriation within one 
year.  
Finally, infringements of constitutional rights can be challenged under 
Mexican law through an “amparo suit”.  This form of legal action is 
routinely used in cases of expropriation.  
The elaborate system of legal protections enacted in Mexico to protect 
property rights against, and in the event of, state expropriation greatly 
enhances the security of private property in Mexico.  These protections 
apply equally to CERs as to any other form of property.
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the applicable land laws, and negotiate 
with such landholders in order to secure 
the necessary title to land, may further 
increase the costs associated with 
structuring a CDM project and resolving 
land title issues.
If the relevant land is subject to customary •	
land rights that are not formally recorded, 
registered, or otherwise difficult to 
characterize,  then it may be more difficult 
for the developer to enforce her rights in 
accordance with Host Country domestic 
law in the event that a competing title 
claim arises or a developer’s land rights are 
otherwise disputed. 
 
As noted throughout this Guidebook, 
uncertainty represents a fundamental barrier to 
the initiation of CDM projects, as it mitigates 
the ability of prospective developers and 
investors to identify and manage risks that may 
bear upon such projects.  Each of the examples 
above has the potential to increase a Host 
Country’s CDM risk profile, and discourage the 
development of CDM projects in the relevant 
Host Country.
The CDM and State Expropriation
Just as important as the legal framework 
governing private property rights is the 
framework governing the property rights of 
the state.  Although the frequency and fairness 
with which expropriation or nationalization of 
property takes place are critical variables in any 
investment, they take on particular importance 
in the context of CDM projects.  
As noted before, CERs exist only by virtue of an 
international treaty—a fact which gives national 
governments broad discretion to regulate 
the trade and possession of CERs.  There is 
a presumption under international law that, 
absent any domestic law to the contrary, Host 
Countries, having agreed to be legally bound by 
the Kyoto Protocol, enjoy sovereign rights to 
the GHG reductions achieved by CDM projects 
hosted within their jurisdictions, and the CERs 
issued with respect to those GHG reductions 
(see section 7). 
As a result, certainty that the private property 
rights of CDM project participants will only be 
expropriated on just terms (i.e., for a proper 
purpose and with fair compensation) will 
mitigate a key risk that may otherwise act as 
a significant deterrent to development of and 
investment in CDM projects within a Host 
Country.  The strongest assurance that may 
be provided to developers and investors is a 
constitutional guarantee that any expropriation 
by the state will take place on such terms.  
Such a guarantee may be supported by 
clarifying statutes or case law that include 
mechanisms for protecting private rights in the 
event of a nationalization, and methodologies 
for determining appropriate remedies where 
private property is expropriated.  
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7 Domestic Law and the CDM:  
 Taxation and Financial Services Regulation
Introduction
Four key issues govern taxation and financial 
services regulation in the CDM context:
Classification(a) . The issue of whether 
CERs will be treated locally as a security 
or a commodity is significant for carbon 
market participants, because securities 
often involve higher transaction costs 
than commodities trading.  These costs 
are primarily due to the more stringent 
regulatory requirements involved in 
securities trading as compared to the 
commodities market, which creates the 
potential for delays;
Foreign exchange controls.(b)  Foreign 
exchange controls may be applicable to 
CER transactions in some jurisdictions.  It 
is unclear whether CER trades are subject 
to foreign exchange controls at all, and if 
so, at what volume these controls would 
take effect;
Tax treatment.(c)  How CER transactions are 
taxed is obviously a pivotal issue. Generally 
these are either levied through direct 
taxes (i.e. retaining a proportion of CERs 
already issued ), or as a tax on the revenue 
generated by the sale of CERs or through 
indirect taxes such as a goods-and-services 
or value-added tax (VAT); and
Restrictions on Foreign Direct (d) 
Investment (FDI). Project participants 
should confirm whether CDM projects 
would be subject to any restrictions on 
foreign direct investment.  Certain Host 
Countries may impose restrictions on 
foreign ownership and/or control of capital 
investment projects and related assets 
which may equally apply to a related CDM 
activity.
 
The international CDM Rules do not explicitly 
define the status of CERs as a security or 
a commodity. These issues, as well as the 
more patently domestic questions of foreign 
exchange controls and taxation, are left to 
domestic regulation. 
The Nature of CERs: Security or Commodity?
While there remains a significant lack of 
clarity about the exact nature of CERs under 
financial services regulations, it is likely that 
CERs in most jurisdictions would be treated 
as a commodity, and accordingly would not 
be subject to securities regulations.   CER 
classification in individual jurisdictions may 
differ however, and this issue needs to be 
assessed by carbon investors on a country-by-
country basis.
Where CERs are treated as commodities, 
under domestic laws they may be treated as 
particular types of commodities, depending on 
the circumstances under which they are created 
or sold.  For example, in cases when a foreign 
purchaser acquires CERs without being involved 
in project development, CERs may be treated 
as “export” commodities, and thus entitled to 
favorable treatment including exemption from 
value-added tax.
In response to ongoing uncertainty around the 
treatment of CERs, some buyers have chosen 
to include provisions in CER purchase contracts 
stipulating that they will not be held liable for 
potential taxes or increased costs due to future 
compliance obligations related to securities 
regulation.  Alternatively, some buyers have 
assumed that such costs will be applied, and 
have adjusted the purchase prices accordingly.  
CDM Host Countries, particularly newer 
entrants in the carbon market, are advised 
to examine this issue. Removing ambiguity 
surrounding domestic classification of carbon 
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risk that comes into effect if the project entity 
defaults in delivery of the credits and has to 
purchase in the international market to make 
good on its obligations.  Ordinarily, this risk 
would be borne by the seller. 
Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment
Many Host Countries impose restrictions on FDI 
in major projects.  However, these restrictions 
are not uniform: while there are strict 
prohibitions on certain investment categories 
(particularly where the project does not accord 
with the country’s national interests), in other 
areas, where a project can import significant 
benefits for the country, FDI restrictions are 
generally less strict.
Often, the principles governing whether 
certain investment falls into an encouraged or 
restricted category align with the principles 
governing the CDM itself, (e.g., their 
contribution to Host Country sustainable 
development, environmental impacts, etc.)  
Projects typically encouraged are often 
those that provide significant employment 
opportunities, increase land productivity or 
facilitate the exploitation of natural resources, 
including minerals, forests or aquatic areas, 
improve the technical skills of employed 
workers, accelerate the development of less 
developed regions or increase the volume and 
value of exports.
Whether FDI restrictions apply to certain 
investments may also depend on the nature 
of the infrastructure sought to be built by a 
company in which foreign capital has been 
invested.  Projects in high-technology fields 
or using new technology, in under-developed 
sectors, in sectors of high market demand or 
that utilize renewable resources in a beneficial 
manner.  In some Host Countries, investments 
credits in securities and commodities law 
should be a clear focal point for regulatory 
enhancement, as such uncertainty has 
purportedly made it difficult for project 
developers in some countries to obtain project 
finance from banks and financial institutions, as 
revenues are viewed as less secure. 
Foreign Exchange Controls
In most CDM transactions, payments for 
CERs sold to an Annex I party will be made in 
currencies other than the Host Country local 
currency.  Whether such CER transactions 
would be subject to foreign exchange controls 
is, however, a highly jurisdiction-specific issue.  
In general, the treatment of CER transactions 
aligns with general foreign exchange control 
provisions in local law.  In some jurisdictions, 
foreign exchange controls have been eliminated 
altogether, while in others, strict limitations still 
apply.  Even where general foreign exchange 
controls are not in place, parties wishing 
to bring in or expatriate currency for CER 
transactions may need to declare this with 
customs authorities.
Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements 
(ERPAs) will typically stipulate that payments 
are to be made in a specified currency; in many 
cases the currency selected will be the Euro.  
However, to the extent that a CER transaction 
incorporates a degree of currency exchange 
risk, it would be possible to allocate this risk in 
the ERPA to one or other party.  Parties may 
choose to agree on and fix an exchange rate for 
the purposes of the transaction, or agree to a 
mechanism for determining the exchange rate 
to apply for payments.
Even where there are no foreign exchange 
controls per se, one of the risks inherent in 
all CDM transactions is the foreign exchange 
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in these ‘encouraged’ categories are entitled to 
enjoy benefits such as streamlined approvals 
procedures, more favorable tax treatment, 
expansions in the scope of their business 
activities, and other advantages.
In some countries, certain categories of 
investment which are permitted to companies 
with majority domestic ownership are 
prohibited altogether to majority foreign-
owned companies.  In some cases this arises 
from constitutional provisions reserving natural 
resources for the state, for management 
on trust for the nationals of that state.  For 
example, some countries may prohibit foreign-
owned companies from participating in certain 
sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, even 
where projects are proposed to be conducted 
under the CDM.  Domestic companies, on the 
other hand, would be free to invest in these 
activities.
FDI laws often also attempt to direct foreign 
investment into a particular region or province 
which is targeted for development or which 
is lagging behind other regions in terms of 
investment volumes.
Foreign investment controls may also have 
the practical effect of restricting the range of 
corporate structures that may be adopted for 
CDM projects.  In China, for example, foreign 
investors seeking to enter the CDM market 
may only do so under an equity joint venture 
in which a maximum stake of 49% is foreign-
owned.  Wholly-owned foreign enterprises and 
contractual joint ventures are not permitted.   
CER Pricing Controls
The international CDM Rules do not prohibit 
Host Countries from setting minimum (floor) 
prices for the sale of CERs, or from withholding 
approval (i.e. LoA issuance) of a proposed 
CDM project if the CERs from the project are 
sought to be sold for less than the applicable 
floor price.  The effect of this regulation is to 
prevent project participants from adopting 
certain project structuring models, because 
such arrangements would fall foul of the pricing 
rules. For example, if a CER buyer sought to 
provide technical or consultancy services in 
exchange for a lower CER price, this kind of 
pricing regulation may prevent a reduction 
adequate to recoup the value of those services.
In China, for example, if a CER sale and 
purchase agreement has been entered into 
when a Chinese LoA is sought prior to 
registration, then the Chinese DNA must 
approve the price paid per CER in that 
agreement.  Although the Chinese CDM 
regulations do not specify a particular 
minimum price, in its implementation of the 
CDM Measures, the Chinese Government has 
effectively set a “minimum floor price” for the 
sale of CERs in China. The Chinese Government 
has stated that, when conducting its mandatory 
review of the terms of CER sale agreements, it 
will not approve CDM projects with a CER price 
lower than the floor price set at that time. 
  
Taxation Treatment
A number of different types of taxes may 
potentially be imposed on CDM projects and 
revenues:
taxation of CER revenues;•	
taxation of business activities, including •	
through business and personal income tax; 
and
taxation of assets, including the land on •	
which CDM projects are developed.
 
In some jurisdictions, preferential tax treatment 
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Case Study: Foreign exchange regulations
Argentina: 
Following the financial crisis of 2001, Argentina put in place very complex exchange 
control regulations, which have imposed restrictions on the flow of funds into and out 
of Argentina.  Among other things, these exchange control regulations provide that 
financing which does not comply with certain requirements relating to, for example, 
terms of re-payment, might be subject to a mandatory 1-year interest free withholding of 
30%.  There are few exceptions to this withholding.
This regulation can potentially impose additional costs on, and barriers to, carbon 
financing in Argentina.  There are informal initiatives to exempt financing for CDM 
projects from these exchange control regulations.
China:
Strict management of the exchange of RMB and foreign currency is enforced in China, 
and CDM project participants must ensure that they carefully comply with these 
regulations.  A foreign-invested enterprise is required to submit a copy of its certificate 
of approval and its business license to the Bureau of Foreign Currency Exchange 
Administration in order to register a record of a foreign exchange and open an account in 
a designated foreign exchange bank. Separate approval is required from the local office 
of the Bureau in order to open an account at a different location or abroad.
Entities within China that require foreign exchange under a current account must buy 
it with RMB from a designated foreign exchange bank, or pay through their foreign 
exchange account held at the designated bank.  Advance payments or commissions can 
be converted into foreign currency at a designated bank on approval of authenticity by 
the Bureau.
Foreign exchange income under a current capital account must be transferred back to 
China and kept in a foreign exchange account at a designated bank.  Approval from the 
Bureau is required if the foreign currency is to be sold to a designated bank or additional 
foreign currency is to be purchased.
Contracts to procure foreign debt must also be registered with the Government in China.  
Accumulated medium- and long-term debt procured in foreign capital directly from 
banks or enterprises outside Chinese territory must not exceed the difference between 
the total investment and the registered capital stipulated in the contract with the foreign 
financier.  A copy of the contract must be kept with the Bureau.  
Entities with foreign capital must also inform the Bureau of when and how the capital is 
actually used.
Finally, foreign-invested entities are required to submit reports on their foreign exchange 
balance twice a year (before 10 March and 10 July).
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is available to foreign-funded enterprises or 
for projects in certain encouraged project 
categories.  This preferential treatment may 
take the form of discounts or rebates on 
standard tax rates, exemptions, offsets and 
reinvestment incentives.  Some countries 
provide preferential tax treatment to CDM 
projects, and particularly projects with 
additional sustainability benefits, such as 
renewable energy. 
Taxation of CER Revenues 
As a matter of policy, some CDM Host 
Countries have declared that CER revenues will 
not be taxed at a domestic level while the CDM 
is still in its infancy.  Mitigating or exempting 
CER revenues from taxation is a powerful 
means of promoting CDM projects and 
encouraging private sector investment.  It can, 
however, be difficult to isolate such revenues 
from others, complicating the provision of 
taxation incentives to CDM projects.
Where taxation is imposed on CERs, it may 
take one of two forms – either the withholding 
of a proportion of CERs issued to project 
participants by the CDM Executive Board, or 
a tax on the revenues generated by the sale of 
CERs after issuance.
The sale or transfer of CERs must be reported 
to the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment and the Vietnam Environmental 
Protection Fund.  Sales fees must be fully paid 
before the transfer of CERs.  CER sales fees 
are remitted to the Vietnam Environmental 
Protection Fund and may be used to cover fee 
collection expenses; expenses in support of 
raising public awareness on climate change and 
CDM; and expenses related to consideration 
and approval of CDM project documents and 
supervision of the execution of CDM projects.
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The revenue derived from a domestic tax 
on CERs may be used to fund sustainable 
development initiatives to further promote 
this core objective of the CDM.  By using 
revenues in this way, a Host Country is able 
to confirm that a project will meet sustainable 
development goals even where projects do 
not have substantial sustainable development 
benefits.  The use of a proportion of CER 
revenues to fund these activities is similar 
to the idea behind the Share of Proceeds for 
Adaptation, which (as discussed above) is 
designed to use the proceeds of CER sales to 
assist vulnerable countries adapt to the effects 
of climate change. 
Taxation of Business Activities and Income
CER revenues may effectively be subject to 
taxation where they are viewed as general 
business income or profits.  Whether or not 
CERs are viewed as a business asset and any 
income generated from the sale of CERs treated 
as business income may be influenced by 
whether CERs are part of the “normal business” 
of the project developer and whether such 
assets are reported by their owner as business 
assets or trading stock. 
Where a personal income tax is levied, project 
developers that are not resident in the CDM 
Host Country may be subject to withholding tax 
at the non-resident rate, which may be higher 
than the tax rate applied to residents.
By contrast, where business income is 
generated in a foreign currency, this may 
allow an exemption from business income for 
company revenue streams.  Project developers 
would need to seek jurisdiction-specific advice 
on these issues.
It is possible that the revenue stream generated 
from the sale of CERs could be treated as 
a capital receipt subject to capital gains 
tax, and certain transactions, activities and 
products may also be subject to stamp duty 
or value-added tax (VAT).  VAT is payable 
in many jurisdictions on sales of intangible 
assets including CERs, where they are defined 
as such.  The appropriate VAT rate to be 
applied will in some cases be dependent on an 
interpretation of whether the CERs are being 
exported—particularly if they are wholly owned 
by a non-Host Country entity, or whether they 
are being locally supplied by a Host Country 
project developer to a non-Host Country entity.
Many taxation regimes permit business to 
seek determinations from taxation authorities 
on their potential liabilities.  This could be 
particularly useful in the context of CDM 
project development, the treatment of which in 
many countries remains subject to uncertainty.
In addition, stamp duty will be payable for 
CDM projects in most Host Countries.  For 
example, in Malaysia, stamp duty – imposed 
on instruments of transfer rather than on 
transactions – is payable for ERPAs.  In relation 
to the conveyance of sale of CERs, ad valorem 
stamp duty of 1% of the consideration on 
the first RM100,000, 2% on the subsequent 
RM400,000 and 3% on the remainder may be 
payable.  
 
Taxation of Assets
Land, vehicles and resources involved in CDM 
transactions may also be separately taxed or 
subject to duties. The amount of the tax may 
vary depending on whether the owner is a 
resident or non-resident, whether the land is 
in a rural or urban area, and the nature of the 
project.  Tax concessions are less common in 
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Case Study: CDM tax incentives in South Africa
South Africa is one of many countries in the process of implementing a variety 
of environmental fiscal reforms aimed at supporting initiatives which promote 
sustainable development, energy efficiency and investments in new or cleaner 
technologies. Among these reform proposals include more favorable tax 
treatment of income derived from the sale of CERs as a means to facilitate the 
hosting of CDM projects. Noting that uncertainty with regard to the South 
African income tax treatment of CERs may have contributed to the slower than 
anticipated up-take of CDM projects, the Finance Minister’s national budget 
speech of February 2009 proposed that income derived from the disposal of 
primary CERs be tax–exempt or subject to capital gains tax instead of normal 
income tax; and, that secondary CERs be classified as trading stock, and taxed 
accordingly. 
On 1 June 2009 the draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill was released 
for comment by the National Treasury, along with a Draft Explanatory 
Memorandum. The Memorandum indicates that, from a tax perspective, 
the disposal of CERs is largely untested in South Africa and that the default 
interpretation, namely to treat disposal of CERs as ordinary revenues from 
trading stock, is likely to result in taxation of CERs at full ordinary rates thus 
potentially adding a prohibitive cost onto otherwise marginal CDM projects. 
Consequently, as part of South Africa’s domestic policy response to climate 
change, tax relief is required to assist in dealing with this issue.
Income Tax Treatment of CERs: The Bill proposes to amend the Income Tax 
Act (1962) to provide for an income tax incentive for the disposal of CERs 
from registered CDM projects in South Africa. The proposal is for such CERs 
to be wholly exempt from income tax which, if accepted, has the potential to 
increase a project’s bottom line by some 28% (at current rates of corporate 
taxation).
Value Added Tax (VAT) Treatment of CERs: The Memorandum further clarified 
the treatment of CERs under South African tax law by noting that a CER should 
fall under the classification of a “right,” “facility” or “advantage” rather than 
a “good”. For the purposes of VAT treatment, supply of CERs shall thus be 
considered as provision of a “service”.  Since the documentary requirements 
for the supply of services are less stringent than for the supply of goods, this 
would represent a de facto advantage to CDM project participants in South 
Africa. Based on the assumption that all CERs generated in South Africa will be 
exported for use by Annex I countries or entities, the Memorandum indicates 
that the supply of CERs by persons operating CDM projects will, by default, be 
exempted from VAT in terms of normal South African VAT rules. 
Source: Warburton Attorneys
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relation to assets than in relation to other forms 
of taxation, although assets uniquely acquired 
for the purpose of implementing a CDM project 
may be eligible for tax concessions in some 
jurisdictions.  
Similarly, import duties will usually be 
contingent on the nature of the good imported 
and the country or region from where it has 
come.  This can be an important consideration 
in relation to equipment manufactured outside 
of the country of the CDM project in which it 
will be used. 
Tax Concessions and Other Fiscal 
Incentives to Promote CDM Projects
Many Host Countries have formulated taxation 
policies and legal provisions in relation to CERs 
that seek to encourage investment in CDM 
projects and to ensure their competitiveness in 
the international market.  Taxation concessions 
and fiscal incentives aimed at promoting 
CDM projects may take various forms.  Often, 
tax concessions in this area aim at stimulating 
investment in new projects; thus, they may only 
apply to new projects or for a limited time period. 
A project is likely to attract tax concessions and 
other fiscal incentives where it is classified as 
an encouraged or promoted investment project 
within the Host Country.  Common tax or fiscal 
incentives include: import duty exemptions or 
reductions; income tax exemptions or reductions; 
and accelerated depreciation.
In a number of countries, CDM projects are 
classified as encouraged investment projects, or 
fall within fields or industries which the state 
seeks to promote or protect, both of which 
generally imply tax concessions or other fiscal 
incentives.  For example, enterprises operating 
within the environmental field in Vietnam 
enjoy various incentives.  As of 1 January 2009, 
when Vietnam’s new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law took effect, such enterprises enjoy a four 
year enterprise income tax (EIT) exemption, a 
subsequent five-year 50% tax reduction, and 
a 10% tax reduction for the whole operation 
period.  
Case Study: Examples of taxation of CER revenues
Vietnam: Taxation of CER revenues
The taxation of CER revenues in Vietnam is set out in guidelines in a joint 
circular of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment.  CER revenues in Vietnam are taxed as a 
percentage of the total number of CERs sold or transferred at the CER selling 
price according to a sale fee rate which ranges from 1.2% to 2% depending 
on the type of project undertaken.  For example, forestry projects and 
renewable energy projects attract a fee rate of 1.2%, whereas recovery of 
methane from landfill will attract a fee rate of 1.5%, and recovery and use of 
associated gas from oil fields will attract a fee rate of 2%.
The guidelines provide that where CERs are not sold but transferred, the 
selling price for the purpose of determining the sales fee will be the market 
price at the time of fee payment.
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Case Study: Taxing for sustainable development in China
Taxation of CER revenues for sustainable development may take different 
forms in different Host Countries.  In China, for example, the Government 
taxes CER revenue in varying amounts depending on the sustainable 
development benefits of the particular project.  In the case of projects that 
do not have substantial sustainable development benefits, taxes of up to 65% 
are imposed on projects such as destruction of HFCs and N2O in industrial 
processes, and the revenue generated is placed in a fund used to promote 
sustainable development (called the Clean Development Fund).  By contrast, 
for priority sustainable development projects (such as renewable energy) and 
forestry projects, the tax imposed is just 2%.  
The proposed uses of the taxation revenue include funding CDM 
administration and approval revenues, climate change-related capacity-
building activities, sponsoring of the preparation of project design documents 
for projects located in poor regions or with high sustainable development 
contributions.
Case Study: Value-Added Tax
Thailand: VAT requirements
Thai regulations concerning taxation of CERs continue to evolve. Although 
CERs may be exempted from VAT requirements in the future, as new 
incentives for the promotion of carbon trading and the CDM are developed, 
under current tax policies, however, the sale of CERs is subject to VAT. 
This is regardless of whether the underlying project falls under the Board of 
Investment of Thailand (BOI) tax privileges scheme for promoted activities, 
because the transfer or sale of CERs is treated as a sale of goods in Thailand. 
Thus, only income from the underlying project is exempted from VAT 
according to this scheme, not income from any goods sold or transferred.
The VAT rate applicable to CERs is 7%.  If the transfer or sale of CERs is at 
no or little cost, then a market price for the CERs will be considered for the 
purpose of calculating the VAT.
India: Classification of CERs as goods
The regulation of CERs in some Host Countries is still in the early stages of 
development.  In India, for example, indirect tax legislation does not provide 
specific guidelines for the VAT treatment of CERs.  CERs may be considered 
to be goods for VAT purposes in India, and so be treated similarly to 
electricity – which is either excluded from the purview of VAT or included in 
the schedule of goods exempted from VAT.
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Tax exemptions for an initial and limited period 
are a common form of incentive provided 
to CDM project investments. Thailand, for 
example, has an eight-year exemption on 
corporate income tax which runs from the 
date on which income is first earned, with 
permission to carry forward losses and deduct 
them as expenses for up to five years.  This is 
combined with exemptions from withholding 
tax on taxable income and dividends derived 
from promoted enterprises during the corporate 
income tax exemption period.  Other incentives 
applying for an initial and limited period in 
Thailand include import duty exemptions on 
machinery for up to eight years.  There are 
also import duty reductions on imported raw 
materials and components.  
A number of states have similar tax provisions 
providing incentives for varying periods of 
time.  In Malaysia, for example, whilst there 
are no CDM specific laws designed to facilitate 
CDM activities, there is a tax exemption 
which applies for income received in respect 
of the sale of CERs with effect from the year 
of assessment 2008 and up until the year of 
assessment 2010.
In many countries, accelerated depreciation 
will constitute another key element of tax and 
fiscal incentives, either applying specifically 
to CDM projects or having a more general 
application.  In Bangladesh, for example, 
accelerated depreciation is available for the cost 
of machinery of a new industrial undertaking 
in the first year of commercial production at 
50%, 30% in the second year, and 20% in 
the third year; and for income derived from 
any small and medium enterprise engaged in 
the production of goods and having a certain 
annual turnover.
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8 Domestic Law and the CDM:      
 Environmental Law
In most Host Countries, major infrastructure 
projects are subject to an environmental 
and planning approvals process, which is 
often entirely separate from CDM-specific 
environmental approvals provided for by 
the international rules.  Environmental and 
planning regulations are important to the CDM 
project cycle because the domestic processes 
for environmental assessment and approval 
can either help or hinder CDM investment 
depending on the difficulty and length of the 
permitting process.  
The international rules impose environmental 
assessment obligations on project developers 
at the validation stage of the CDM project 
cycle.  In order to have a project validated 
and obtain registration as a CDM project, it 
is necessary to obtain approval from the Host 
Country DNA (in the form of an LoA).  As part 
of the DNA approval process, Host Countries 
must consider the domestic and transboundary 
environmental and sustainability impacts of the 
proposed project activity.  Information on these 
impacts is contained in the CDM Project Design 
Document (PDD). 
The CDM PDD, which must be completed for 
all projects, contains an Environmental Impacts 
section in which project participants are 
required to describe the environmental impact 
of the project activity to the location and 
surrounding area.  If the impact is considered 
significant by either the project participant or 
the Host Country, a full environmental impact 
assessment is required.  Once the project 
is validated by the DOE and Host Country 
approval is obtained, the project proposal is 
forwarded to the Executive Board for formal 
registration.
Under the international CDM rules, a Host 
Country is free to decide the content of the 
domestic environmental impact assessment 
and how it is to be applied to the CDM project 
approvals process.  Most Host Countries 
treat CDM projects in the same way as other 
infrastructure projects for the purposes of 
environmental assessments.  However, interplay 
between the international system and domestic 
law is important.  Unlike other projects, CDM 
projects must go through lengthy international 
CDM approvals, so it may be advantageous for 
the Host Country to coordinate the timing of 
these two processes, as was decided in the case 
of Mauritius (see Section 5). 
Domestic Environmental Laws
The domestic environmental law regime in 
CDM Host Countries governs three main areas:
(a) The content and application of the 
environmental impact assessment, 
where project participants are required 
to complete this under the international 
rules;
(b) Any environmental approvals that are 
required to carry out the project activity, 
including licenses, operating permits, 
planning permits and any others; and
(c) Any environmental regulations or 
restrictions that are imposed on projects 
conducted within the Host Country, such 
as pollution restriction, obligations to 
maintain biodiversity or natural habitat, 
and so on. 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
As noted above, Host Countries are free to 
determine the content of environmental 
assessments required for CDM project approval. 
Host Countries can also determine the types 
of projects that must undertake an EIA and 
the environmental impacts that are considered 
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sufficiently ‘significant’ to trigger a mandatory 
EIA.
EIAs are often required for projects in a number 
of categories, including industry, mining, 
thermal power plants, river valleys, ports, 
harbors, airports, communications, atomic 
energy, transport and tourism.  Some Host 
Countries have also imposed a requirement 
that EIAs be conducted for any project type 
involving investment at a certain level.
EIAs must usually identify the project sponsor 
and the entity preparing the EIA, and provide:
a description of the project;•	
a description of any applicable laws and •	
land-use regulations;
a description of the affected environment, •	
including base environmental conditions 
and potentially affected area;
an evaluation of environmental impacts, •	
including waste generation, power and 
water consumption, social and health 
impacts, pollution impacts (air, noise, 
water, land)
an evaluation of alternatives to the project •	
activity;
a plan for preventing and mitigating •	
environmental impacts, including a disaster 
management plan; and
methodological and technical data to •	
support all conclusions.
In some countries, different categories of 
EIAs (with different degrees of rigor required) 
must be completed depending on the likely 
environmental impacts of the project.  For 
example, project activities involving industrial 
parks, aquaculture facilities, nuclear facilities, 
dams, highways and railways and other projects 
with multiple and cumulative environmental 
effects, or projects that may destroy or 
isolate ecosystems or have other large-scale 
environmental impacts, may require a full-scale 
EIA that assesses the likely impacts across the 
entire region or ecosystem.  For projects with a 
smaller anticipated environmental footprint, EIAs 
may be limited to the project boundaries and 
immediately surrounding area.
Environmental assessment can be a major hurdle 
to CDM project implementation.  Some project 
developers therefore intentionally seek out 
projects that do not require EIAs as a way to 
minimize transaction costs and administrative 
burdens.  However, even where Host Country 
regulations do not require a full EIA to be 
completed in respect of a project, a process 
of public consultation may still be required.  If 
significant controversy surrounds the project, 
the public consultation can be a hurdle; in many 
cases, however, consultation can be satisfactorily 
complete in a short time, even within just one 
meeting.
When a developer has to complete an EIA for a 
CDM project, it can be an onerous process and 
an additional source of risk for investors.  The 
EIA process may take up to 18 months, or even 
longer in some cases.  Where EIA approval is 
required before the Host Country CDM approvals 
process can even begin, this adds further months 
to the already drawn-out project cycle.  
While the application for an EIA is free in 
many countries, the process of developing the 
application can be quite costly.  A developer 
must hire paid consultants, who will conduct 
scientific studies on the environmental impacts 
of the project as well as respond to public 
comments on the project.   
Environmental Approvals
In addition to the environmental impact 
assessment process required for approval as a 
CDM project, most Host Countries will have 
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some additional environmental approvals that 
project developers will need to obtain in order 
to construct and operate a major infrastructure 
project.  There may be several approvals that 
need to be obtained for a single project, and 
the time to obtain these and the cost involved 
in applying may be a significant hurdle.
Environmental permits and approvals are 
often required for each stage of project 
development – for example, a preliminary 
permit may be required to undertake feasibility 
studies in an area, a construction or installation 
permit may be required to build the project, 
and an operations permit may be required to 
begin operation of the facility.  In addition, 
multiple permits can sometimes be required 
for the same project development stage and 
in many cases these will be issued by different 
government agencies or by different levels 
of government.  In granting these approvals, 
authorities in Host Countries may impose a 
series of conditions requiring project developers 
to minimize environmental harms.  Obtaining 
environmental licenses may also require a 
separate environmental impact assessment 
to be undertaken.  To the extent that this 
is streamlined with the EIA required for 
CDM approval, this may reduce the burden 
on project developers at the feasibility and 
conception stage (see the example of Mauritius, 
above).
Difficulties can arise for project developers 
where there are excessive delays in obtaining 
one or more approvals or permits from Host 
Country authorities.  The preparation and 
approval of the EIA itself can represent a major 
delay for certain projects (usually those likely 
to cause per se harms to the environment, 
such as major roads, railways, ports, chemical, 
oil or mining projects, airports and industrial 
complexes. .  
Furthermore, some countries may require 
that environmental permits and approvals 
be renewed annually, creating an additional 
administrative burden for project participants.  
For small or less-experienced project 
developers, keeping up-to-date with these 
requirements may be difficult to manage.
In some Host Countries, the number and 
type of environmental permits and approvals 
required will depend on the form of pollution 
that is anticipated to be generated by the 
project.  For example:
Air pollution permits•	  may be required if 
the project will generate atmospheric 
emissions (such as from chemicals, 
petroleum, petrochemicals, paints and 
dyes, automotive, pulp and paper, 
metallurgy, glass, electricity generation, 
asbestos, cement and lime or waste 
disposal).  Such permits may be required 
even where the project in question is 
intended to reduce the atmospheric 
emissions from an existing facility.
Water pollution permits•	  may be required 
where a project seeks to discharge effluent 
into waterways, including rivers, drains and 
sewage systems.
Hazardous materials permits•	  may be 
required for projects seeking to transport, 
store, handle or dispose of hazardous 
wastes.  It should be noted that cross-
border transportation of hazardous 
wastes will also be subject to the Basel 
Convention on Cross-Border Transportation 
of Hazardous Wastes.
Forestry permits•	  may be required 
for exploitation of forests and the 
establishment of commercial plantations.  
Whether an operational license is required 
in a particular country may also depend on 
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Case Study: Environmental Approvals in Brazil
Environmental approvals are required at each stage of project development 
in Brazil.  DNA project approval requires licenses to be obtained.  In order 
to undertake a project, a preliminary permit, an installation permit, and an 
operation permit must be obtained.  The function of each is as follows:
Preliminary permit: required to undertake an initial feasibility study of the 
intended location – usually issued within 20 to 40 days.
Installation permit: required to begin construction of the facility – usually 
issued within 30 to 90 days.
Operations permit: required to operate the business, after completion of a 
satisfactory inspection of the facility from the environmental agency to ensure 
the terms and conditions of the approvals are being complied with – usually 
issued within 30 to 60 days.
An environmental impact statement is required for infrastructure that is likely 
to harm the environment.  This may take between 8 and 18 months to approve, 
depending on the outcome of stakeholder consultation and other factors.
The environmental licensing process in Brazil is regulated by federal, state, and 
municipal laws.  The competent authority to issue an environmental license is 
determined according to the environmental impact generated by a project – for 
example, if an activity has a purely local impact, the Municipal Authority may 
be in charge of the licensing process.  Uncertainty may arise in determining the 
agency responsible for issuing licenses as this is not always evident.  In some 
cities with a larger industrial presence, legislation may require a municipal 
license for the operation of industrial facilities and landfills, notwithstanding 
the fact that the state’s environmental agency also requires the activity to be 
submitted to the state’s licensing process.
Brazil’s licensing process, like that of many Host Countries, may be both timely 
and costly, particularly when an EIA is required.  It is important to assess 
whether the expected volume of emission reductions from a certain project 
may be impacted by delays in license processing, in particular by the time of 
execution of the ERPA, as the agreement should include provisions which 
protect investors from loss related to delay of the licensing process or possible 
non-delivery.
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the industry sector of the project, since the 
environmental impacts of certain sectors are 
assumed to be greater than other sectors.  The 
following sectors are commonly listed in Host 
Country environmental regulations as requiring 
specific environmental approvals:
hydraulic works, communication, oil and •	
gas pipelines, coal ducts and “polyducts”;
oil, petrochemical, chemical, iron and •	
steel, paper, sugar, cement and electric 
industries;
mining activities;•	
hazardous/radioactive waste facilities;•	
forestry use in tropical forests and forest •	
plantations;
changes of soil use in forests, including arid •	
zones and tropical forests;
real estate developments affecting coastal •	
ecosystems;
works in wetlands, mangroves, lagoons, •	
rivers, lakes, estuaries connected to the sea 
and their shores;
works in protected natural areas;•	
fishing, aquaculture or fish farming that •	
could endanger fish species or harm 
ecosystems; and
works that could cause serious or •	
irreparable harm to ecosystems or public 
health.
Liability for Environmental Harms
With most CDM projects, there is a risk that 
project participants could be held liable under 
domestic law for any environmental harms 
arising from the project activity.  Depending 
on their actual level of involvement in the 
operation of a project, this risk extends both 
to a foreign buyer as well as to a local project 
owner/operator.
In general, a project participant may be held 
liable for environmental harms in the event 
that the CDM project itself causes damage 
to the environment (for example, if methane 
capture pipes rupture and contaminate a large 
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tract of agricultural land).  In order to hold any 
project participant liable in this circumstance, 
it would be necessary to demonstrate causality 
– that is, that the environmental damage was 
directly caused by the project activity and not 
some other factor – and also that the project 
participant was directly involved in causing the 
harm.  It is unlikely that a foreign buyer, who 
has no involvement in a project other than the 
offtake of CERs, would be held to have had 
sufficient involvement in causing the harm for 
liability to attach under domestic law, although 
this is ultimately an issue that needs to be 
assessed on a project by project basis.
To minimize risks, prospective project 
participants should always perform a thorough 
due diligence of the project to assess the 
current condition of the site and assess any 
potential for future liability.  In some countries, 
the DNA will in fact require all project 
participants (both domestic and foreign) to sign 
a statement that the project activity complies 
with applicable local labour and environmental 
standards, which will require a certain level of 
due diligence to be undertaken.  The signing of 
this statement will be a condition precedent for 
the issue of a Host Country LoA.  
The risk of environmental liabilities can be dealt 
with contractually in an ERPA by means of an 
indemnity clause, in which a seller indemnifies 
the buyer with respect to “the development 
and operation of the Project”.  An indemnity 
drafted in this way should be broad enough 
to cover situations where a buyer as project 
participant is somehow implicated in liability 
of the project under domestic law - most likely 
because it has had some actual involvement 
in the project, rather than merely because it is 
listed under the international rules as a project 
participant.  If desired, the indemnity clause 
could exclude liability for environmental harms 
more specifically.
In addition, the ERPA could contain warranties 
as to the condition of the site, the manner of 
operation of the project and the accuracy of any 
statement signed by the project participants 
guaranteeing the environmentally soundness of 
the project activity.  
The ERPA could also require that the project 
entity maintain insurances adequate to the 
project activity and the assessed level of risk 
associated with it.  Such insurances could 
cover third party liabilities posed by the project 
itself, including specific environmental damage 
risks, together with risks posed to the project 
itself, including by natural disasters, electricity 
failures, disease outbreaks or civil unrest.  
Such risks can also be managed by including 
appropriately drafted force majeure clauses in 
the ERPA.  
Project participants should also be aware of the 
requirements of the Annex I country granting 
approval and the implications of any statements 
made to that country’s DNA.  In the UK, for 
example, project participants are required to 
sign a statement confirming the accuracy of 
the PDD and the compliance of the project 
with local environmental standards.  The 
consequences for making a false declaration 
are severe, and may include fines or even 
imprisonment.  Where such a declaration is 
required to be made, project participants (even 
CER off-takers) should conduct a due diligence 
of the project, regardless of their assessment 
of their likely liability under Host Country 
domestic law.
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Domestic CDM Project Risks
The development and implementation of a 
CDM project involves a number of complex 
processes that must be completed in order 
to have the project registered by the CDM 
Executive Board, and CERs issued in respect of 
the GHG reductions achieved.  Host Countries 
are directly involved in several aspects of 
the CDM project cycle, and also regulate the 
day-to-day operation of CDM projects and the 
broader projects and operations of which they 
form part (e.g. a cement factory at which a 
waste heat recovery CDM project is located). 
As result, project developers face a number of 
Host Country domestic CDM project risks when 
seeking to develop a CDM project.  These risks 
vary between Host Countries and also between 
CDM project sectors.  Examples of the key Host 
Country domestic CDM project risks that must 
be considered by project developers include:
(a) With respect to issuance of LoAs:
•	 the criteria and procedures for 
issuance of LoAs may be uncertain or 
unclear, creating doubt as to whether 
a potential CDM project will be 
approved by a Host Country;
•	 the application for a Host Country 
LoA may be rejected by the Host 
Country DNA, such that either the 
application for an LoA must be 
revised and re-submitted, potentially 
at additional cost, or the project 
cannot be registered; and
•	 a Host Country LoA may be revoked 
prior to registration of the project, 
such that either a new LoA must be 
sought, potentially at additional cost, 
or the project cannot be registered.
(b) The project may not be able to satisfy 
additionality requirements as a result 
of the project being required to be 
developed as a matter of compliance with 
Host Country law, such that it cannot 
be considered additional and therefore 
cannot be registered.
(c) The Host Country, as a Kyoto Protocol 
Party involved in the project, is entitled 
under the CDM Rules to (through its 
DNA) request review of the project 
following its submission for registration, 
on the basis of any issue relating to its 
validation.
(d) The Host Country may request review of 
the GHG reductions verified with respect 
to the project, on the basis of any issue 
of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence 
of the DOE conducting verification and 
certification.
(e) There may be uncertainty under Host 
Country law as to which party has title to 
CERs, creating a risk of parties bringing 
competing claims to the CERs, potentially 
including Host Country claims where the 
resource required for the project, e.g. 
hydropower and geothermal renewable 
energy resources, are vested in the state.
(f) It may be difficult for a project developer 
to obtain the non-CDM approvals 
necessary to implement the project, for 
example a foreign project developer may 
not be eligible to obtain the necessary 
approvals It may be difficult for a project 
developer to obtain the non-CDM, or 
the nature of the relevant regulations 
and processes makes obtaining approval 
difficult.
(g) There may be other regulatory factors 
within a Host Country that affect 
the ability of a project developer to 
implement a CDM project, or that affect 
its financial viability.  For example, it may 
be difficult for a new CDM electricity 
generation project to gain access to the 
domestic electricity grid, or the Host 
Country may provide subsidies to existing 
9 CDM Project Risks and Risk Management
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(c) Ownership of the project outputs (CERs 
and non-carbon products).  If an Annex 
I Entity wishes to assist a Host Country 
entity in generating and commercializing 
both carbon and non-carbon products 
(i.e. CERs and other project outputs 
such as electricity), then the Annex I 
Entity may seek to take on relatively 
broad responsibility with respect to the 
development of the project as a whole, 
including both CDM and non-CDM 
aspects (see Project Development 
Agreement, Carbon and non-Carbon, 
discussed below).
In each case, the rights of each party in respect 
of CERs, CER revenues, and non-carbon 
products generated by a CDM project will 
depend on how the project is structured, and 
the allocation of rights, responsibilities and 
risks agreed by the participants as part of this 
structure. 
 
Contracting for Different 
CDM Project Structures
Structuring of CDM projects is a complex 
process, and the final project structure is likely 
to be unique in each case, adapted to the 
particular circumstances and requirements of 
the parties involved.  However, certain basic 
project structures have been tested in the 
CDM market and proven effective in multiple 
jurisdictions and CDM project sectors.  Three 
such structures, as discussed in the examples 
given above and involving differing degrees 
of project ownership and involvement by the 
Annex I buyer, as well as different rights and 
risks for the parties involved, are set out below.
 
 
generators that make it difficult for new 
generators to be cost-competitive.
Structuring CDM Projects to 
Manage Project Risks
CDM projects, and the purchase of the CERs 
they generate, may be structured in a variety 
of ways, in order to accommodate the various 
risks associated with a particular project as 
discussed above, and the relative expertise 
and resources (including finance) of the 
parties involved.  Different project structures, 
each entailing specific (high or low) levels of 
exposure for each party to the relevant risks, 
may incorporate differing approaches to: 
(a) Ownership and operation of underlying 
project assets.  For example, if a buyer 
wishes only to purchase CERs, the buyer 
is not likely to participate in the broader 
project development and implementation, 
such as the operation and maintenance 
of an industrial facility of which an energy 
efficiency CDM project forms part.  The 
buyer is also unlikely to accept any of the 
risks associated with this broader project.  
Instead, the buyer will simply agree to 
purchase some or all of the CERs issued in 
respect of the project (see ERPA offtake 
model, discussed below).
(b) Ownership and operation of the CDM 
project.  Where an Annex I Entity wishes 
to purchase CERs in the primary market 
at a relatively low price, and to this end is 
willing to assist a Host Country to develop 
a CDM project and accept a higher level of 
exposure to project-related risks, then the 
Annex I Entity may choose to provide up-
front finance for the project and assume 
responsibility for some or all aspects of 
developing the CDM project (see ERPA 
Developer Model, discussed below).
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Project Development Agreement, 
Carbon and non-Carbon
Under a CDM project structure based on a 
Project Development Agreement (PDA), the 
Annex I entity becomes involved in the project 
at an early stage, accepting full responsibility 
for the design and development of the CDM 
project, from elaboration of the initial project 
idea through to registration and ultimate 
issuance of CERs. 
Under a PDA, the Host Country entity generally 
need play little or no part in the development 
and implementation of the CDM project, 
particularly as regards taking the project 
through the CDM project cycle to registration, 
and the ongoing monitoring and verification 
of the GHG reductions achieved.  This may be 
particularly beneficial where the Host Country is 
relatively new to the CDM and its functioning, 
and so requires support from a party more 
experienced and familiar with the relevant 
processes, in order successfully host the project 
and generate CERs.  The Host Country entity 
may, however, be responsible for the operation 
of the CDM project facilities and equipment, 
as well as operation of the underlying project 
facilities, such as power stations hosting 
fuel-switch CDM projects, and landfills hosting 
landfill gas capture and flaring CDM projects. 
Where an Annex I entity agrees to take full 
responsibility for the development of a CDM 
project under a PDA, the Annex I Entity will 
generally also seek to take all (100%) of the 
CERs generated by the project.  This may 
require the Host Country entity to assign to the 
Annex I entity any and all rights it may have 
with respect to the CERs, in consideration for 
provision by the Annex I entity of its expertise 
and services in developing and implementing 
the project.  Such an assignment will mean the 
Annex I entity acts as the seller of CERs in any 
ERPA subsequently agreed with a third party for 
the sale and purchase of CERs from the project. 
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The Host Country entity and Annex I entity 
can, however, agree under the PDA to share 
the revenue from the sale of CERs in particular 
proportions.  In addition, the Annex I entity may 
be more familiar with carbon markets and so 
better positioned to locate a suitable buyer for 
the CERs, and achieve a higher sale price.  It is 
generally also easier for sellers to sell all of the 
CERs generated by a CDM project to a single 
buyer, rather than dividing the CERs across 
multiple buyers (such as would be the case if 
the Host Country retained title to a proportion 
of the CERs, and sold them independently 
to a different buyer).  For these reasons, a 
CDM project structure based on a PDA and 
incorporating an assignment of rights to CERs 
and sharing of CER revenues may enable Host 
Country entities to realize maximum benefit 
from a CDM project, even where they lack 
specific CDM knowledge and experience. 
It should also be noted that PDAs may extend 
beyond the CDM aspects of a project to also 
cover the non-CDM or non-carbon aspects of 
the project.  For example, where a CDM project 
at a landfill involves the capture and flaring of 
landfill gas, and also the generation of electricity 
from the heat produced by flaring, the Annex 
I entity may accept responsibility for design, 
procurement installation and/or operation of the 
electricity generation facilities, in return for a 
share of the revenues generated from the sale of 
electricity into the local grid.  
ERPA Developer Structure
The ERPA developer structure, like the PDA 
structure, involves the Annex I entity accepting 
responsibility for the development and 
implementation of the CDM project, and using 
its CDM expertise to take the project through 
to registration and manage the monitoring and 
verification processes necessary for issuance 
of CERs.  This structure is therefore also 
appropriate where the Host Country entity is 
less familiar with the CDM and its requirements, 
and requires the support and expertise of a more 
experienced CDM project developer in order to 
undertake the contemplated CDM project.  
Unlike the PDA structure, however, the ERPA 
developer structure does not incorporate an 
assignment to the Annex I entity of the Host 
Country entity’s rights to CERs generated by the 
project.  Rather, the Host Country entity retains 
the initial rights to receive CERs generated by 
the project, and agrees to sell the CERs to the 
Annex I entity under a conventional sale and 
purchase arrangement. 
In this way, the Host Country entity would act 
as the primary seller of the CERs, and would 
receive payment from the Annex I Entity for 
all CERs.  The price per CER may, however, be 
reduced on the basis of the project development 
services provided by the Annex I entity.  
Alternatively, the Annex I entity may not be 
required to pay for the first CERs generated 
by the project up to an agreed volume, in 
consideration of the costs and services already 
paid and provided by the Annex I entity in 
developing the project. 
ERPA Offtake Structure
The ERPA offtake structure reflects an 
arrangement in which a Host Country project 
developer retains responsibility for the design, 
development and implementation of a CDM 
project, and then sells the CERs to an Annex I 
entity who has no involvement in the project 
other than as purchaser of CERs.  This approach 
is therefore better suited to Host Country 
entities able to more confidently take the 
project through the CDM project cycle, and 
manage the process of verifying GHG reductions 
and arranging issuance of a corresponding 
number of CERs. 
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This is in some ways the simplest CDM project 
structure, as Host Countries are better positioned 
to deal with the project development and 
approval processes imposed under the relevant 
domestic law.  Use of the ERPA offtake structure 
also has the potential to help Host Country 
project developers and CER sellers to realize the 
highest price per CER, given that the Annex I 
buyer has invested relatively little in the initial 
development and implementation of the project. 
The structures set out above all assume that the 
Annex I Entity purchasing CERs will not take an 
equity interest in the CDM project.  Although 
foreign ownership of CDM projects and related 
assets is often prohibited under Host Country 
law, this is not always the case.  The possibility 
of foreign ownership of CDM projects is 
discussed in section 6.4.  
Contracting Risks
Contracting to buy and sell CERs gives rise to 
a number of legal risks and issues related to 
the contractual rights and obligations of each 
party.  Typically in the primary market, a contract 
for the sale of CERs (usually referred to as an 
Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement or 
“ERPA”) will have two parties: a Host Country 
seller and Annex I buyer.  Sale structures and the 
corresponding ERPAs may, however, be more 
complicated than a simple sale and purchase 
transaction, potentially involving multiple sellers 
and/or buyers, other parties such as consultants 
who may be entitled to a portion of CERs, 
and also more complex payment and delivery 
structures involving secondary purchasers, 
custodians (to hold CERs) and escrow agents (to 
hold payments).
Some of the key risks associated with ERPAs and 
their terms and conditions as relevant to Host 
Country entities are set out below.
Selling on the Spot Market or 
under a Forward Contract
CERs can be sold and purchased: 
on a single “spot” trade basis, once the •	
CERs have been allocated or issued; or
on a forward basis, with multiple future •	
delivery dates for CERs over a number of 
years. 
 
Each of these sale arrangements gives rise to 
different risks and issues. 
Spot trades
Once CERs have been issued by the CDM 
Executive Board, they can generally be freely 
traded on the “spot” market, with immediate 
transfer of the CERs and settlement of the 
trade. 
Permits or emission allowances under domestic 
or regional emissions trading schemes, such 
as European Union Allowances (EUAs) issued 
under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), are generally traded on a spot basis, 
because they will typically have already been 
allocated or issued to the seller at the time the 
trade is agreed. 
Nonetheless, CERs can also be traded on a spot 
basis once they have been issued by the CDM 
Executive Board. 
The fact that in a spot trade the CERs are 
already held by the seller removes any risk that 
they will not actually be generated or available 
to trade (which is a risk in forward trades).  This 
reduced risk is reflected in the following terms 
typical of spot trades: 
sellers of CERs in spot trades can agree to •	
sell guaranteed volumes of CERs (this can 
be contrasted against sellers in forward 
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trades, who may be unwilling to guarantee 
delivery of a specific volume of CERs if they 
have are not already held by the seller); 
and
prices for spot trades are typically higher •	
than for forward trades, given that the 
buyer is not required to take on any 
delivery risk and the seller is guaranteeing 
delivery. 
 
Forward trades
CERs are frequently sold on a forward basis, as 
part of a future stream of CERs generated by a 
specific CDM project and sold under an ERPA 
specific to that project. 
CERs sold on a forward basis do not yet exist 
(the underlying GHG reductions must first be 
achieved and verified, and the CERs issued by 
the CDM Executive Board).  They therefore 
cannot be delivered to the buyer until they 
have actually been issued.  This means that 
CERs sold in forward trades are subject to the 
risk that they may never in fact be issued.  This 
delivery risk gives rise to the following issues:
Where a forward trade of CERs is agreed •	
even before the relevant CDM project has 
been registered or commissioned, there 
is a risk that these milestones will never 
be achieved and the CERs will never be 
generated.  In this situation, the ERPA 
for the sale should include conditions 
precedent preventing the ERPA from 
coming into force until the project is 
actually capable of generating CERs.
Generation and issuance of the CERs may •	
require the performance of certain tasks 
with respect to the CDM project, such as 
preparation of the PDD, validation of the 
project, and verification and certification 
of the GHG reductions it achieves.  
Responsibility for these will need to be 
allocated to a party under the ERPA.
Given the risk that a CDM project will not •	
generate the anticipated volume of CERs, 
sellers may be unwilling to guarantee 
delivery of a specific CER volume, such 
that the buyer will need to agree to buy a 
non-guaranteed volume of CERs.
Where a seller agrees only to sell a non-•	
guaranteed volume of CERs, the buyer 
must accept the risk that the credits will 
never be generated, and may use this as a 
basis for negotiating a reduced price.  
Selling a Guaranteed Volume or 
only the Volume Generated
CERs can be sold either: 
in fixed volumes, with the seller •	
guaranteeing to deliver a specified number 
of CERs on or before a particular date; or
on the basis of the actual volume of CERs •	
generated by a CDM project, such that 
volumes are not guaranteed but subject to 
project performance. 
 
Delivering guaranteed volumes
Host Country primary sellers are often unwilling 
to guarantee delivery of a fixed volume of 
CERs in a forward trade, given that there is 
no guarantee that the CERs the project will 
actually generate the required volume of CERs.
Some sellers are, however, willing to agree to 
delivery on such terms where the seller’s risk 
of being unable to meet its delivery obligations 
can be mitigated.  Mechanisms used by sellers 
to mitigate such risks include:
In primary transactions: by agreeing to sell •	
only a percentage of the CERs anticipated 
to be generated by a CDM project, to 
allow for a degree of project under-
performance. 
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In both primary transactions and secondary •	
transactions: by using preconditions that 
manage key project risks, e.g. by making 
each party’s obligations conditional on 
project registration and/or commissioning.
For sellers in secondary transactions: by •	
pooling CERs from multiple projects and 
selling from this pool, such that delivery 
risks are spread across a number of 
projects. 
By guaranteeing delivery of a fixed volume 
of CERs, sellers can often obtain a higher 
CER price than would be achievable in the 
context of non-guaranteed delivery.  Likewise, 
purchasers can feel more comfortable that 
they will receive the CERs they’ve agreed to 
purchase.
Non-guaranteed deliveries 
Rather than guaranteeing fixed delivery 
volumes, sellers often agree to sell and deliver 
a non-guaranteed volume determined by 
reference to the volume of CERs actually 
generated by a CDM project. 
For example, a seller may agree to deliver: 
all of the CERs generated by a project; •	
a particular percentage of the CERs •	
generated; or 
all CERs generated up to a specified •	
volume cap. 
 
A secondary seller may agree to only sell the 
CERs that it actually receives from a primary 
seller.  In this way, neither the primary nor the 
secondary seller is at risk of delivery default if 
the project underperforms. 
A buyer purchasing a non-guaranteed volume 
of CERs will typically pay a lower price per CER, 
given the buyer’s acceptance of the risk that the 
credits will never be generated.  This risk may 
also create compliance risks for buyers who 
are seeking to acquire CERs in order to comply 
with an emissions trading scheme such as the 
EU ETS.  
Costs and Taxes 
Implementing CDM projects and procuring 
issuance of CERs entails a variety of costs that 
must be paid before CERs can be delivered.  
These costs can include:
fees and costs associated with the •	
registration of the CDM project, including 
fees charged by Designated Operational 
Entities to validate the project in 
accordance with the CDM Rules;
the costs of monitoring the number of •	
GHG reductions achieved by a CDM 
project during a particular period, and 
having these reductions verified and 
certified by a Designated Operational 
Entity; 
fees charged by the CDM Executive Board •	
for issuance of CERs; and
fees charged by registry administrators to •	
open registry accounts and transfer CERs in 
and out of such accounts.
 
Buyers and sellers will need to allocate 
responsibility for these costs between them.
CERs are generally also subject to various taxes, 
including taxes specific to CDM projects as well 
as more general taxes on goods and trade.  
Responsibility for costs and taxes is a 
commercial issue to be negotiated between 
buyers and sellers.  Where a buyer agrees 
to pay certain costs and taxes, it can use 
this as a basis for seeking a lower CER price.  
Responsibility for costs and taxes can also 
be passed through to secondary purchasers, 
but this will potentially affect the CER price a 
secondary purchaser is willing to pay. 
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Default under ERPAs
The most common types of default in CER 
transactions are:
breaches of material obligations (e.g. •	
delivery failure by the seller, or payment 
failure by the buyer);
breaches of the representations and •	
warranties given by a party the ERPA; and
a party becoming insolvent. •	
 
Parties will often be allowed a “cure period” 
(for example thirty or sixty business days) during 
which it can rectify the default, for example 
where a purchaser inadvertently fails to make 
payment due to an administrative error. 
If the default is not rectified within the cure 
period, the non-defaulting party will be entitled 
to claim remedies for the default.  These 
remedies will typically be specified in the ERPA, 
and may include:
the right to terminate the ERPA; and•	
the right to claim damages from the •	
defaulting party. 
 
ERPAs can provide for damages to be calculated 
using either of the following approaches:
Liquidated damages: damages are •	
calculated using an agreed methodology set 
out in the ERPA, often based on the cost to 
the non-defaulting party of entering into a 
replacement transaction with reference to 
an expressly defined market index.
Unliquidated damages: damages are •	
calculated in accordance with the governing 
law on the basis of the total losses the non-
defaulting party determines it has incurred 
as a result of the default and termination.  
 
 
Damages provisions generally apply equally 
to the buyer and the seller, so each will bear 
the same risk in agreeing to liquidated or 
unliquidated damages. 
Another key issue for buyer and sellers is the 
enforceability of the ERPA under the laws of 
the Host Country.  Even where the ERPA may 
nominate laws other than the Host Country 
laws as the governing law of the ERPA, issues 
can still arise in relation to the ability of the 
buyer or seller in enforcing the terms of the 
ERPA within the Host Country legal system.  
This is an issue which project developers need 
to consider.  This risk is typically mitigated 
by the parties by obtaining a legal opinion on 
the enforceability of the ERPA under the Host 
Country domestic law, either prior to entering 
into the ERPA, or as a condition precedent to 
the entry into force of the ERPA.
Disputes under ERPAs
It is almost always quicker, simpler and cheaper 
to resolve disputes through negotiation 
or arbitration, rather than litigation.  This 
applies equally to disputes in relation to CER 
transactions.  For this reason, ERPAs often 
include provisions requiring the parties to go to 
arbitration, if a dispute cannot be resolved by 
negotiation.  
The arbitration provisions in ERPAs will define 
the terms for the arbitration, so they need to 
address the following issues:
the rules that will govern the arbitration, •	
e.g. the Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce; 
the location for the arbitration (this should •	
be a neutral location); 
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the language to be used in the arbitration •	
(this will often be English, but will need to 
be reasonable for both parties);
the number of arbitrators (generally one or •	
three arbitrators will be appointed); and
the means by which the arbitrator(s) are to •	
be appointed. 
 
ERPAs that include arbitration provisions may 
nonetheless allow a party to seek an injunction 
or other preliminary protection from a court, 
in order to avoid irreparable damage such 
as disclosure of confidential information or 
breach of exclusivity requirements.  This will 
not, however, affect the general obligation to 
arbitrate rather than litigate. 
Each ERPA must also specify its governing law.  
The terms and conditions of the ERPA will be 
interpreted in accordance with the specified 
governing law, so the chosen law will be an 
important factor in any dispute and resulting 
arbitration.  English law is generally adopted 
in ERPAs for international CER transactions, 
but local law may be preferred in some 
transactions. 
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Summary of Project Risks and Mitigants
The table below summaries some of the project risks discussed in this 
chapter, and briefly identifies potential means through which these 
risks can be mitigated within the project structures discussed above. 
CDM Project Stage Risks Mitigants
Pre-registration Project fails to achieve registration, for example due to:
failure to obtain Host Country LoA;	
failure to be successfully validated by a DOE; or	
rejection of project following review by the CDM Executive 	
Board. 
Under ERPA Developer and Offtake models, include a precondition in ERPA that 	
payment and delivery obligations ineffective until project is registered;
Under ERPA Developer model, buyers may be able to require indemnity from seller for 	
buyer’s costs e.g. advance and project development costs, if project fails to become 
registered.
Under Project Developer and ERPA Developer models, Host Country entities may be 	
able to require indemnity from Annex I developer for Host Country entity’s costs if 
project fails to become registered.
Verification The Host Country through its DNA may request review of the 
GHG reductions verified with respect to the project, on the basis 
of any issue of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence of the DOE 
conducting verification and certification. 
Under all project structures, require DOE to indemnify project participants under 	
contract for verification and certification services against any loss sustained as a result 
of DOE fraud, malfeasance or incompetence resulting in cancellation of CERs following 
review. 
Title to Project and 
CERs
Where it is uncertain which party has title to CERs under Host 
Country domestic law, there is a risk of parties bringing competing 
claims to the CERs, which may result in disputes or difficulties 
in selling the CERs.  This may include Host Country claims in 
respect of CERs, where the resource required for the project, e.g. 
hydropower and geothermal energy resources, are vested in the 
state. 
Under Project Developer Model where Annex I developer entity take full title to all CERs 	
generated, an assignment and waiver in respect of all current and future rights to CERs 
should be sought from all potential competing title holders, including Host Country 
entity named in Host Country LoA. 
Under ERPA Developer and Offtake models, buyer should seek representation and 	
warranty from seller that seller has full, unencumbered legal and beneficial title to all 
CERs delivered and purchased. 
Non-CDM Approval 
of Project 
It may be difficult for a project developer to obtain the non-CDM 
approvals (i.e. other than the LoA) necessary to implement the 
project, for example where the developer is a foreign entity and is 
not eligible to obtain the necessary approvals under Host Country 
law, or the nature of the relevant regulations and processes makes 
obtaining approval difficult. 
Under ERPA Developer and Oftake models, include a precondition in ERPA that 	
payment and delivery obligations ineffective until project is commissioned. 
Under ERPA Developer model, buyers may be able to require indemnity from seller 	
for buyer’s costs e.g. advance and project development costs, if project fails to achieve 
commissioning. 
Under Project Developer and ERPA Developer models, Host Country entities may be 	
able to require indemnity from Annex I developer for Host Country entity’s costs if 
project fails to achieve commissioning. 
Operation of 
Project
There may be a change in the Host Country laws or regulations 
applicable to a CDM project that may undermine its continued 
ability to operate.  Such changes may include environmental or 
other laws that affect its practical operation, or fiscal or financial 
laws that affect the viability of the project.  
Under all project structures, include in all contractual documentation a “change in law” 	
provision entitling the parties to renegotiate or, if necessary, terminate the project in 
the event of a change in Host Country domestic law that affects the ability of the project 
to operate.  If no express change in law provision is included, such a regulatory change 
may be able to be characterized as a force majeure event, although the rights and 
obligations of each party in the event of force majeure are not likely to be as useful in 
such situations as those usually provided for in a change in law provision. 
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Summary of Project Risks and Mitigants
The table below summaries some of the project risks discussed in this 
chapter, and briefly identifies potential means through which these 
risks can be mitigated within the project structures discussed above. 
CDM Project Stage Risks Mitigants
Pre-registration Project fails to achieve registration, for example due to:
failure to obtain Host Country LoA;	
failure to be successfully validated by a DOE; or	
rejection of project following review by the CDM Executive 	
Board. 
Under ERPA Developer and Offtake models, include a precondition in ERPA that 	
payment and delivery obligations ineffective until project is registered;
Under ERPA Developer model, buyers may be able to require indemnity from seller for 	
buyer’s costs e.g. advance and project development costs, if project fails to become 
registered.
Under Project Developer and ERPA Developer models, Host Country entities may be 	
able to require indemnity from Annex I developer for Host Country entity’s costs if 
project fails to become registered.
Verification The Host Country through its DNA may request review of the 
GHG reductions verified with respect to the project, on the basis 
of any issue of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence of the DOE 
conducting verification and certification. 
Under all project structures, require DOE to indemnify project participants under 	
contract for verification and certification services against any loss sustained as a result 
of DOE fraud, malfeasance or incompetence resulting in cancellation of CERs following 
review. 
Title to Project and 
CERs
Where it is uncertain which party has title to CERs under Host 
Country domestic law, there is a risk of parties bringing competing 
claims to the CERs, which may result in disputes or difficulties 
in selling the CERs.  This may include Host Country claims in 
respect of CERs, where the resource required for the project, e.g. 
hydropower and geothermal energy resources, are vested in the 
state. 
Under Project Developer Model where Annex I developer entity take full title to all CERs 	
generated, an assignment and waiver in respect of all current and future rights to CERs 
should be sought from all potential competing title holders, including Host Country 
entity named in Host Country LoA. 
Under ERPA Developer and Offtake models, buyer should seek representation and 	
warranty from seller that seller has full, unencumbered legal and beneficial title to all 
CERs delivered and purchased. 
Non-CDM Approval 
of Project 
It may be difficult for a project developer to obtain the non-CDM 
approvals (i.e. other than the LoA) necessary to implement the 
project, for example where the developer is a foreign entity and is 
not eligible to obtain the necessary approvals under Host Country 
law, or the nature of the relevant regulations and processes makes 
obtaining approval difficult. 
Under ERPA Developer and Oftake models, include a precondition in ERPA that 	
payment and delivery obligations ineffective until project is commissioned. 
Under ERPA Developer model, buyers may be able to require indemnity from seller 	
for buyer’s costs e.g. advance and project development costs, if project fails to achieve 
commissioning. 
Under Project Developer and ERPA Developer models, Host Country entities may be 	
able to require indemnity from Annex I developer for Host Country entity’s costs if 
project fails to achieve commissioning. 
Operation of 
Project
There may be a change in the Host Country laws or regulations 
applicable to a CDM project that may undermine its continued 
ability to operate.  Such changes may include environmental or 
other laws that affect its practical operation, or fiscal or financial 
laws that affect the viability of the project.  
Under all project structures, include in all contractual documentation a “change in law” 	
provision entitling the parties to renegotiate or, if necessary, terminate the project in 
the event of a change in Host Country domestic law that affects the ability of the project 
to operate.  If no express change in law provision is included, such a regulatory change 
may be able to be characterized as a force majeure event, although the rights and 
obligations of each party in the event of force majeure are not likely to be as useful in 
such situations as those usually provided for in a change in law provision. 
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10 Glossary
 
A & R Afforestation and Reforestation.
Additionality The reduction in anthropogenic GHG emissions achieved 
by a CDM project that is additional to any reduction that 
would have occurred in absence of the CDM project.  In 
other words, additionality is the requirement that the 
GHG emissions after implementation of a CDM project are 
lower than those that would have occurred in the most 
plausible alternative scenario to the implementation of 
the CDM project.  This alternative scenario may be the 
business-as-usual case (that is, the continuation of current 
emission levels in the absence of the CDM project), or 
it may be some other scenario which involves a gradual 
lowering of emissions intensity.  Additionality is a principal 
condition for the eligibility of a project under the CDM. 
Afforestation The direct human-induced conversion of land that has not 
been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested 
land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced 
promotion of natural seed sources.  It is distinct from 
Reforestation, which is the conversion of land that was not 
forested on 31 December 1989 to forested land.
Annex B Countries Those countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, 
being a list of Annex I Countries that have committed to a 
quantitative emission reduction target under Article 3.1 of 
the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex I Countries Parties to the UNFCCC that have committed to emission 
restraints under Article 4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC 
as listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (generally developed 
countries and countries undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy).
Annex I Entity An entity located in the jurisdiction of an Annex I Party 
that has been authorised by that Party to participate in a 
CDM project.
Assigned Amount The amount of GHG emissions (expressed in AAUs) that 
an Annex B Party can emit during the Commitment Period 
taking into account the quantified emission limitations 
reduction commitments of Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
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AAU Assigned Amount Unit - A unit issued pursuant to the 
relevant provisions on registries in decision – CPM.1 of the 
Marrakesh Accords and is equal to one metric tonne of 
CO2e.
CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent - the unit of measurement 
used to indicate the global warming potentials defined 
in decision 2/CP.3 of the Marrakesh Accords or as 
subsequently revised in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which sets out the procedure for revision 
of methodologies and adjustments.
CDM Clean Development Mechanism – flexible mechanism 
under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol with the purpose 
to (1) assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable 
development; (2) contribute to the ultimate objective 
of the UNFCCC; and (3) assist Parties included in Annex 
I achieve compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.
CDM Executive Board The formal governance body established under Article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol to oversee the implementation 
and administration of the CDM, under the authority and 
guidance of the COP/MOP.
CDM Modalities Modalities and procedures for the CDM as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and adopted by the 
COP/MOP at its first meeting.  Separate modalities and 
procedures exist for large-scale, small-scale, forestry 
and small-scale forestry projects.  The modalities and 
procedures provide for the process for approval and 
use of methodologies; the independent verification and 
certification of emission reductions from project activities; 
and oversight by the Executive Board of key processes 
including registration and review.
CDM Project An emission reduction project which is intended to be 
registered with the CDM Executive Board and ultimately 
realise the delivery of CERs.
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CDM Registry Standard electronic database established and maintained 
by the CDM Executive Board which contains common data 
elements relevant to the issuance, holding, transfer and 
acquisition of CERs.
CDM Rules Collectively the Kyoto Protocol, the decisions of the COP/
MOP and the decisions of the CDM Executive Board.
CER Certified Emission Reduction - a unit issued under the 
CDM pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and 
all other relevant requirements and which is equal to one 
metric tonne of CO2 equivalent.
COP/MOP COP/MOP Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, being the 
Kyoto Protocol’s supreme body. The sessions of the COP 
and COP/MOP are held during the same period.  COP/
MOP decisions are usually referenced CMP.
CPA CDM Programme Activities – the individual activities that 
make up a Programmatic CDM project.  A CPA is a single, 
or a set of interrelated measure(s) which produce GHG 
Reductions or result in net anthropogenic GHG removals 
by sinks, applied within a designated area defined in the 
baseline methodology.
DNA Designated National Authority – the national authority for 
CDM designated by a Party to the  Kyoto Protocol.
DOE Designated Operational Entity – an independent legal 
entity accredited by CDM Executive Board and designated 
by the COP/MOP that can validate proposed CDM 
projects and verify and certify GHG emission reductions.
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment.
ERPA Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement – one form of 
buying and selling CERs.
GHG Reduction A reduction in emissions of GHGs or unit of sequestered 
GHGs equivalent to one metric ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent.
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GHG One or more of the six gases listed in Annex A to the 
Kyoto Protocol that trap heat when released into the 
atmosphere, being carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). They occur through natural 
and human-induced activities.
Host Country The non-Annex I country in which a CDM project is based.
JV
 
Kyoto Protocol
Joint Venture, or an entity formed between two or more 
parties to undertake economic activity together.
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC signed at the third 
COP meeting, establishing binding Annex I GHG emission 
reduction targets of 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-
2012. 
LoA Letter of Approval – A letter issued by the Designated 
National Authority of the Host Country to a CDM project 
confirming that the project, as proposed, will assist 
the Host Country to achieve its goals of sustainable 
development.
Marrakesh Accords The Marrakesh Accords are the aggregate decisions of 
the COP from decision 2/CP.7 through to decision 24/
CP.7 inclusive of the COP in its seventh session, held at 
Marrakesh, Morocco from October 29 to November 10, 
2001.  These decisions were adopted by the COP/MOP at 
its first meeting in Montreal in November 2005.
Non-Annex I Countries Countries which are not listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC 
(generally, developing and least developed countries).
PDD Project Design Document – the document to be prepared 
and submitted by Project Participants to an accredited 
DOE for validation of a proposed project activity.
PIN Project Idea Note – an indicative document used during 
the development of a CDM project that precedes the 
Project Design Document.  A PIN sets out the basic details 
and aims of a CDM project.
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PoA Programme of Activities – the standard or policy that forms 
the basis for a Programmatic CDM project.
Project Participants The legal entity (both public and private entities) that 
develop and implement CDM projects.
Reforestation The direct human-induced conversion of non-forested 
land to forested land through planting, seeding and/or 
the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, 
on land that was forested but that has been converted 
to non-forested land. For the First Commitment Period, 
reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation 
occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 
December 1989.  (See also, afforestation).
Supplementary  
CDM Laws
Domestic laws, policies and other instruments introduced 
by Host Countries in addition to those prescribed by the 
CDM Modalities and CDM Rules which aim to regulate 
CDM activities within their jurisdictions.
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, signed at the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 
May 1992.
VAT Value-Added Tax.
VVM Validation and Verification Manual – a standard which 
aims to promote quality and consistency in DOE reports 
and ensure each CDM project activity meets all applicable 
CDM requirements.  The VVM was adopted by the CDM 
Executive Board at its 44th meeting and sets out principles 
to guide DOE involvement in Validation and Verification of 
CDM projects.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) continues 
to evolve organically, and many legal issues remain to 
be addressed in order to maximise its effectiveness. This 
Guidebook explains through case studies how domestic 
laws and regulatory frameworks in CDM Host Countries 
interact with international rules on carbon trading, 
and how the former can be enhanced to facilitate the 
implementation and financing of CDM projects.  
Authored by leading experts from Baker & McKenzie's 
Global Environmental Markets Practice team with 
assistance of CDM practitioners and research collaborators 
from around the world, Implementing CDM projects: 
Guidebook to Host Country Legal Issues, is the newest 
addition to our CDM Guidebook series, and a companion 
to the groundbreaking UNEP – Baker & McKenzie Legal 
Issues Guidebook to the CDM (2004)
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